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ABSTRACT
Semantic theory has been used for many different philosophical purposes, This thesis investigates
two such uses of semantic theory. The first is the use of semantic theory in providing a justification
for a formal theory. The second is the use of semantic theory in yielding an account of
understanding.
The first paper is "Truth and Metatheory in Frege", In this paper, it is contended, against much
recent work in Frege interpretation, that Frege should be credited with the first semi-rigourous
formulation of a semantic theory, In so doing, it attempts to show that many of the arguments
which purport to establish that Frege could not have engaged in semantic theorizing suffer from
two kinds of misconceptions. The first misconception involves the notion of truth which a
philosopher must accept in order to engage in such theorizing, The second misconception involves
the sort of justification which these arguments assume a semantic theory attempts to provide.
The second paper is "Frege's Thesis", For each primitive expression in a language, two questions
may be asked. The first is: what is it in virtue of which that expression has the semantic value it
does? The second is: what is it in virtue of which a speaker counts as understanding that
expression? Frege's Thesis states that one answer can be given to both of these questions; that the
account of what it is in virtue of which a speaker understands an express;on can also serve as the
account of why that expression has the semantic value it does. In this paper, Frege's Thesis is
defended. First, it is argued that some objections against it result from a confusion between
semantics and metasemantics, Second, the Thesis is defended against traditional objections from
Kripke and Putnam.
The third paper is "Rigidity and Content", According to much recent philosophy of language, if
two utterances differ in modal semantic value, then they must express different things. In this
paper, it is argued that this view is false. In particular, it is argued that the notion of content which
results from this consensus is incompatible with fundamental philosophical principles relating
content to use,
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Truth and Metatheory in Frege
According to much recent work on Frege, Frege lacked a semantical metatheory.
Appearances to the contrary, such as Frege's seeming attempts, in Part I of the Basic Laws of
Arithmetic, to provide an interpretation of his formal language as well as metatheoretical
justifications of his rules of inference, are explained away, usually on the basis that to take
them as such would conflict with foundational tenets of his philosophy. The purpose of this
paper is to subject several of the underlying arguments of this recent work in Frege
interpretation to critical scrutiny.
One of the most sophisticated examples of this line of thought is to be found in the work
of Thomas Ricketts, Accordingly, the majority of this paper is devoted to countering his
arguments. Contra Ricketts, I shall argue that Frege indeed crucially invokes a semantical
metatheory in the Basic Laws, his central logical work, and that that there are no convincing
reasons to believe that this conflicts with Frege's general philosophical programme,
In section 1, a brief summary is given of those views of Ricketts that will concern us here,
Section II is negative. In it, I argue that there is little reason to embrace Ricketts' conclusions,
In Section III, I shall argue that some principle motivations for not taking Frege's apparently
semantical remarks at face value stem from a misconception of the nature of semantical
theorizing. Section IV is a brief attempt to stress the importance Frege attached to justifying
his formal theory by classically semantical means, Finally, in Section V, I turn to the relation
between Frege's works and model-theoretic semantics,
Section 1.
According to Ricketts, Frege's conception of logic is founded on his theory of judgement.
As we shall see in the next section, Ricketts takes Frege's theory of judgement to imply that
Frege ascribed to a view of truth equivalent to the conjunction of the following two theses;
(i) each occurrence of the word 'true' is eliminable in favor of a sentence not
containing the word 'true'
(ii) Tarski's equivalence schema is the only principle governing occurrences of the
word 'true'.
Let us call this theory The Redundancy Theory of Truth, By Thesis (i) of this theory,
ineliminable occurrences of the truth-predicate are ruled out. But if we wish to express the
validity of inference rules, or logical laws, we must use the truth-predicate ineliminably in
generalizations.' Thus, Ricketts takes Frege's theory of judgement to preclude expressions of
the validity of inference rules or logical laws, and thereby to exclude "a genuine semantical
metaperspective",
Ricketts argues further that "once truth is excluded as a property, Frege has no
nonsyntactical metalogical vocabulary" ([1986b], p.83). Now, Ricketts concedes that Frege's
talk of denotation in introducing his formal system could be "easily read as anticipations of the
post-Tarskian interest in semantics" ([1986a], p.176). But Ricketts believes that to read it in
this way is a grave error, Frege's use of expressions such as "denote" in the exposition of his
formal system should not be interpreted as "incipient theorizing about a relation between
words and things" ([1986a], p,176).
1
"...[A]ny attempt to account for the validity of an inference is bound to use the notion of
truth ineliminably in generalizations" (Ricketts [1986a], p. 176). One might think that one
could express the validity of inference rules by the use of corresponding logical laws. But,
according to Ricketts, this would "obviate the distinction between logical laws and rules of
inference" ([1986b], p, 83).
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Unfortunately, Ricketts' interpretation of the term "denote" is never supported by textual
evidence, since, as Ricketts himself points out, Frege certainly seems to use the term in a
classically semantical manner, Rather, Ricketts argues indirectly for his view, First, he argues
that Frege's conception of logic bars a semantical metaperspective. He then concludes from
this that one cannot understand Frege's talk of reference semantically, as this would conflict
with his conception of logic,
Two consequences flow from Ricketts position. The first of these is for Frege's position in
the philosophy of language. If Frege's conception of judgement and logic rules out any sort of
semantical metaperspective, then it also rules out the formulation of classical questions of the
philosophy of language, which deal with the relations between words and their interpretation. 2
A second, and related implication of Ricketts position is that if it is true, then the semantics of
formal languages as developed by Tarski and others, would be utterly incomprehensible to
Frege,3 In order to understand semantical results, one must have recourse to a metaperspective
from which one can speak of relations between a formal language and its interpretation, But
on Ricketts' view, Frege had no perspective from which he could separate a formal language
from its interpretation. Hence, metatheoretic questions such as soundness or completeness
would make no sense for Frege, 4
2
"[For Frege] there is no standpoint from which to ask whether the thoughts expressed by
the statements of language really represent reality, whether they are really true or false,,,Here
there is only the work of disambiguation, amplification, and clarification. This task requires
no metaperspective" ([1985], p. 8),
3E.g., "...anything like formal semantics, as it has come to be understood in the light of
Tarski's work on truth, is utterly foreign to Frege" ([1986b], p. 67).
4 Burton Dreben and Jean Van Heijenoort ([1985], p.44) agree with this consequence of
Ricketts' position:
For Frege, and then for Russell and Whitehead..,. metasystematic questions as such, for
example the question of completeness, could not be meaningfully raised, We can give
different formulations of logic, formulations that differ with respect to what logical
11
Thus, Ricketts' position has quite severe consequences, If it is true, then semantical
questions, both in logic as well as the philosophy of language, would make no sense for Frege,
It is worth mentioning that there are other, less severe interpretations. For instance, one might
believe that there are certain semantical questions, such as completeness, which would have
made no sense to Frege, but reject Ricketts' more powerful thesis. Be that as it may, for
Ricketts, Frege's apparently semantical remarks serve only an expository, or elucidatory
purpose. These elucidations should in no way be interpreted as invoking the type of semantical
metaperspective implicit in modem semantics.
Section II.
On the face of it, non-syntactical terms occur frequently in Part I of the Grundgesetze,
Most noteworthy is the term 'denote' [bedeuten], which seems to be a non-syntactical term par"
excellence. Another classically semantical term, the truth-predicate, also appears, but emended
to fit Frege's conception of truth as an object. Instead of saying that a sentence is true, Frege
says that a sentence denotes the True.5 Now, a central thesis of this paper is that one way in
which Frege uses his truth-predicate is in giving a justification, in the metalanguage, of the
rules of inference of the Begriffsschrift, Since this is precisely the sort of use of a
metalanguage that Ricketts denies to Frege, this section is devoted to countering Ricketts'
arguments.
The justification of the inference rule of modus ponens lies in the fact that if a conditional
is true, and its antecedent is true, then so is the consequent. This fact gives some justification
constants are taken as primitive or what formulas are taken as formal axioms, but we have
no vantage point from which we can survey a given formalism as a whole,
5From now on, I use the expression 'is true' to express whatever is expressed by Frege's
expression, 'denotes the True'.
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to accepting modus ponens as a rule of inference in a logical system by pointing to its truth-
preserving nature. But according to Ricketts, a justification of this sort is, for Frege, out of the
question:
On the contemporary conception of logic, the acceptance of MP as a correct rule of
inference is vouchsafed by our metalogical judgement that if a conditional is true and
its antecedent is true, then so is the consequent. This judgement is not supposed to
appear as a premise in every proof employing MP; it rather is a part of our reason for
accepting derivations in some given formal system as proofs. But a statement of the
validity of MP unavoidably involves taking truth to be flatly a property of thoughts.
This treatment of truth is precluded by Frege's conception of judgement ([1986b] ,
p.83).
A justification of a rule of inference requires the ineliminable use of a truth-predicate.
According to Ricketts, however, Frege's conception of judgement rules out truth as an
ineliminable property of thoughts; indeed according to Ricketts, truth is not, for Frege, a
property of thoughts at all. Thus, on Ricketts' interpretation of Frege, no such justification
could be given.
Now, there is a trivial sense in which Ricketts is correct in his assertion that truth, for
Frege, is not a property of thoughts. There are many passages where Frege argues for this
thesis. But in these passages, he is of course arguing that the relation of a thought to truth is
not the relation of subject to predicate, but rather the relation of a sense to its referent, Thus,
the relation of a thought to the True is not to be understood on the model of subject and
predicate, but rather as parallel to the relation between the sense expressed by the singular
term 'Bob', and the person, Bob, The issue here, however, is whether Frege ever appeals, in
introducing his formal system, to a semantic predicate, 'denotes the true', which expresses a
13
property of thoughts, in the same manner as 'denotes Bob' is a semantic predicate true of
certain singular terms.6 It is this latter question to which Ricketts responds in the negative,
Initially, Ricketts' view may seem implausible, After all, before every section in which a
rule of inference is introduced, Frege gives a justification of the rule, which looks, for all
intents and purposes, exactly like the metalogical judgement discussed above, For instance, in
the beginning of § 14, where Frege introduces Modus Ponens:
(1) From the propositions "i-A D F" and "-fA" we may infer "e•"; for if F were not
the true, then since A is the true A D F would be the false,7
A similar justification is offered for the other rules of inference. 8 Here, it would seem, Frege's
truth predicate is being used in a similar manner as in the contemporary metalogical assertion,
namely as an ineliminable property of thoughts. Hence, it seems natural to read (1) as an
attempt at a justification, in the metalanguage, of Frege's inference rule, Just as in the modem
case, (1) helps justify Frege's inference rule by pointing to the fact that it expresses the
6From now on, I shall use the term 'denote' ambiguously, First of all, I shall use it in the
ordinary sense; that is, as expressing a relation between words and things. But I shall also use
it to express that relation between the sense(s) expressed by a term and the referent of that
term. Thus, to each relation between expressions and their denotations, there corresponds a
similar relation holding between the sense of the expression in question and the denotation of
that expression, I use the term 'denote' ambiguously as between these two relations.
7Frege's rule is a generalized version of modus ponens. Note also the strange use Frege
makes of his capital Greek letters. The natural interpretation of the quotation marks occurring
in this passage is that they are devices of quasi-quotation. But if this were the case, then the
capital Greek letters 'A' and 'F' would have to be used as names of unspecified expressions.
But then the sentence "A is the true" would be patently false, for the True is a value-range, not
an expression.
8Similar soundness type proofs are also given for the axioms, although Frege's defense of
the truth of axiom V is (with good reason!) more hesitant,
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inference that we use when we infer from the truth of a conditional and its antecedent, the
truth of its consequent,9
According to Ricketts, however, we must reject this interpretation of Frege's remarks, For
such a justification involves construing truth as an ineliminable property of thoughts, And such
a use of the truth-predicate is, as we have seen, supposedly "precluded by Frege's conception
of judgement", To evaluate this claim, let us now turn to a closer consideration of Ricketts'
arguments,
Ricketts's central argument is a reinterpretation of an argument of Frege's, given in his
1918 paper, "The Thought", which purports to establish the indefinability of truth. As one
may recall, in this paper, several arguments are given against the correspondence theory of
truth. One of the arguments is then generalized as an attempted reductio ad absurdum of any
possible definition of truth:
[Any attempt] to define truth breaks down, For in a definition, certain characteristics
would have to be specified. And in application to any particular case the question
would always arise whether it were true that the characteristics were present. So we
would always be going round in a circle ([1984a], p. 353).
This argument is unsatisfactory, for reasons that are well-known,.I Ricketts, however, claims
that in order to appreciate the argument, we must view it within the context of Ricketts'
Frege's conception of judgement, Seen in this context, according to Ricketts, "The proper
conclusion to the argument is not that truth is a primitive property, but that truth is not a
property at all" ([1986b], p.79),
According to Ricketts, then, viewing Frege's argument within the context of Ricketts'
Frege's conception of judgement transforms it into a valid argument for the conclusion that
91n the next section we shall have more to say about why we should construe Frege in this
manner,
1oSee, for example, Michael Dummett's discussion in Chapter 13 of his [1981].
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truth is not a property of thoughts, Laying aside objections to Ricketts' interpretation of Frege's
conception of judgement, let us pause to evaluate this claim.
Three facts about Ricketts' Frege's conception of judgement, coupled with Frege's
argument, are taken by Ricketts to imply that for Frege, truth is not a property of thoughts,
First of all, according to Ricketts' Frege, in order for a speaker to be able to make a
judgement, it must be in principle possible for the speaker to verify whether the judgement is
correct. The second fact about Ricketts' Frege's conception of judgement is the following thesis
about the nature of the act of judging;
Judgement is not itself a special recognitional capacity, a species of some genus,
Judgement is itself the genus - to recognize anything to have a property is ipso facto
to make a judgement ([1986b], p,77),
Thus, we have two facts about Ricketts' Frege's conception of judgement: (i) it must be in
principle possible to verify the correctness of the judgements one makes, and (ii) to recognize
anything to have any property is to make a judgement. The third fact about Ricketts' Frege's
conception of judgement can be expressed as the following conditional; (iii) if truth is a
property of thoughts, then in order to correctly make a judgement, I must antecedently
acknowledge that the thought expressed by some sentence which represents that judgement is
true. Now let us consider how these three facts about Ricketts' Frege's conception of
judgement bear upon Frege's argument,
Let us assume (i), (ii), and (iii), as well as the thesis that truth is a property of thoughts.
Using Frege's argument, we shall attempt to derive a contradiction, Now, if truth is a property
of thoughts, then we can give some content to the notion of correctness, or assertiblity. A
judgement is correct, or assertible, only if the thought expressed by a sentence which
represents the judgement is true, So let us now say that we wish to assert that snow has the
property of whiteness, In order to do so, by (iii), we must first ask ourselves whether the
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thought expressed by the sentence "Snow is white" has the property of truth. But by (ii), the
act of determining whether the thought expressed by the sentence "Snow is white" has the
property of truth is itself an act of judgement. So we must then ask whether this act of
judgement is correct. Thus, by (iii), we must ask whether the thought that the thought
expressed by the sentence "Snow is white" is true is itself true.1 But this, in turnm, is itself a
judgement. Hence, the regress begins. Thus, if truth is a property, in order to determine
whether I can assert that snow is, in fact, white, I must determine the correctness of an infinite
number of other judgements. But since I am a finite being, this is impossible, contra (i).
Ricketts' argument is perfectly valid. Its central oddity is rather that it implies the opposite
of what Frege actually seems to conclude. Rather than ending the argument, as Ricketts would
have it, by asserting that truth is not a property of thoughts, Frege concludes that "the content
of the word 'true' is sui generis and indefinable", Ricketts' rather weak explanation of Frege's
closing remarks is that Frege's use of the term 'indefinable' here should not be taken to mean
what Frege usually means by the word, 12 Rather, we are to take Frege's claim that truth is
indefinable as expressing the quite different proposition that "truth..,cannot be understood to be
a primitive unanalyzable property of thoughts" ([1986b], p.79).
Ricketts' reinterpretation of the moral Frege draws from his own argument becomes even
stranger when one considers the other article of Frege's in which the same argument is given,
In Frege's article "Logic", where we find, almost word for word, the same argument, we also
find Frege drawing a conclusion that seems quite antithetical to Ricketts' interpretation:
JI assume that the thought that the thought expressed by "Snow is white" is true is
expressed by some appropriate sentence,
'
2
"Frege's talk of indefinability in this context should be understood differently from his
other uses of this notion" ([1986b], p. 7 9),
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Now it would be futile to employ a definition in order to make it clearer what is to be
understood by 'true'.,,[For consider] any definition of the form 'A is true iff it has
such-and-such properties or stands in such-and-such a relation to such-and-such a
thing'. In each case in hand it would always come back to the question whether it is
true that A has such-and-such properties, or stands in such-and-such a relation to such-
and-such a thing. Truth is obviously something so primitive and simple that it is not
possible to reduce it to anything still simpler ([1979a], pp, 128-129),
Just as in the previous case, it seems quite strange to take Frege as really concluding that truth
is not a simple, unanalyzable property of thoughts, Rather it seems that Frege took the
argument to show that truth is primitive, simple, and unanalyzable. Evidence that Frege, in
addition, took truth to be a property of thoughts appears two pages after he gives the above
argument:
The sense of an assertoric sentence I call a thought. Examples ofthoughts are laws of
nature, mathematical laws, historical facts: all these find expression in assertoric
sentences, I can now bemore precise and say: The predicate 'true' applies to thoughts,13
Although such passages are not conclusive, they do give the impression that Frege took the
truth-predicate to express a property of thoughts, it thus seems dubious to take as the moral
that Frege draws from his argument the thesis that the predicate 'true' does not express a
primitive, simple property of thoughts.14
But how does Frege's argument establish what Frege takes it to establish, namely that truth
is indefinable? Let us call an "informative characterization of truth" any characterization which
supplies a predicate, satisfaction of which constitutes a necessary and sufficient condition for a
thought to denote the True, yet which expresses a different Sense than the ordinary truth-
'
3 [1979a], p. 131., and similarly, a few pages later:
Almost everything that we have said about the predicate 'true' holds for the predicate 'false'
as well. In the strict sense it applies only to thoughts, Where it looks to be predicated of
sentences or ideas, still at bottom it is being predicated of thoughts.
'
4The seeming contradiction between these quotes and Frege's espousal of the doctrine that
the word "true" denotes an object is, of course, illusory, In these passages, Frege is speaking
of the predicate 'true', i.e, "denotes the true",
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predicate, 'is true'. I suggest that Frege's argument shows truth to be indefinable by
demonstrating the impossibility of any such characterization.
Obviously, if Frege's argument is to succeed, powerful premises are needed, In particular,
some premise is needed that allows Frege to conclude that "it will always come back to the
question of whether it is true that A has such-and-such properties". In other words, Frege is
appealing to a principle which implies that in asserting that A is (D, we are actually asserting
that it is true that A is D. Such a principle is to be found in Frege's characterization of
assertion as the manifestation of the act of acknowledging the truth of a thought, 15 Assuming
this principle, let us now turn to Frege's argument.
Assume that we have specified some condition, expressed by the predicate D, which gives
us an informative characterization of truth.16 Thus, our assumption entails that;
(2) p is true - p has the property expressed by D,
Now let us say that we wish, via our necessary and sufficient condition, to determine whether
p is true, By (2), we can accomplish this by determining whether p has the property expressed
by D. But, by our premise, determining that p has this property amounts to acknowledging that
it is true that p has this property, But we wish to determine that p is true via the sense of D
alone, and without the use of the predicate 'is true', So in order to determine whether it is true
that p has the property expressed by D via our necessary and sufficient condition, we must
determine whether the thought that p has the property expressed by D itself has the property
expressed by Q. And so the regress begins.
15[1984a], p. 356. Richard Cartwright has pointed out to me the awkwardness of Frege's
use of the factive verb "acknowledge" [aner/cennen] in this context, If judgement is the
acknowledgement of the truth of a thought, then we can never judge incorrectly. Similar
remarks hold for Frege's description of judgement as the "inward recognition of the truth of a
thought". For familiarity's sake, I will, however, retain Frege's terminology,
'6'"O" is here replaceable by names of predicates.
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Truth, for Frege, is the most general logical notion. Some laws of logic are laws of
identity, and others laws of generality, but all logical laws are laws of truth. It is a familiar
point that a logical relation, such as the identity relation, cannot be explained in terms which
themselves do not invoke the notion of identity. Frege's regress argument is a general
argument for this conclusion for the case of the property of truth. But just as we do not, in the
case of identity, conclude that identity is not a "real" relation, so we should not, in the case of
truth, conclude that it is not a "real" property,
The argument, thus rendered, is an expression of Frege's belief that "the content of the
word 'true' is sui generis and indefinable". Furthermore, the thesis that the truth-predicate
expresses a primitive, simple, property of thoughts is fully consistent with this interpretation,
Ricketts, on the other hand, must, in effect, either ignore or re-interpret most of what Frege
himself has to say about the argument. Thus, not only do there exist other readings of Frege's
argument which are consistent with the thesis that truth is a property of thoughts, but Ricketts'
gloss of Frege's argument seems to contradict the very conclusions which Frege himself took
the argument to imply,
If Frege had thought that the truth-predicate did not express a property, then Ricketts
would be justified in ascribing the Redundancy Theory of Truth to Frege. As we have seen,
however, not only does Ricketts fail to demonstrate that Frege believed the truth-predicate did
not express a property, but the evidence bears strongly in favor of the opposite conclusion,
In assertions of the validity of inference rules, the truth-predicate occurs ineliminablv.17
But such a use of the truth-predicate is inconsistent with the Redundancy Theory of Truth, So
far we have shown Ricketts' central argument for ascribing this theory to Frege to be
17Henceforth, except where indicated, I will not use the term "validity" in the model-
theoretic sense, but rather in the straightforward intuitive sense of "truth-preserving no matter
what we take as the values of the schematic letters",
20
unpersuasive. But before we conclude that Frege's apparent statements of the validity of
inference rules are what they appear to be, it would be good to have more evidence against the
view that Frege believed the truth-predicate must be capable of elimination in all of its varied
occurrences,
There are two contexts of interest to us in which the truth-predicate occurs ineliminably.
The first context is in generalizations, of which assertions of the validity of inference rules
form a sub-species, A simple example of such an occurrence, not involving rules of inference,
is the following:
(3) Everything Socrates ever asserted was true.
Presumably, no one alive today can list every statement ever uttered by Socrates, Because of
this unfortunate epistemic limitation, there is no way to avoid the use of the truth-predicate.
But an even more serious situation arises in the case of a statement of the validity of an
inference rule, For at least we can be sure that Socrates uttered only a finite number of
statements. The variables occurring in the statement of the validity of an inference rule,
however, range over an infinite number of sentences. Thus, our own mortality stands in the
way of eliminating these occurrences of the truth-predicate.
The second context in which the truth-predicate occurs ineliminably is with sentences that
lack a truth-value. For assume that the sentence "Pegasus swims" does not have a truth-value.
Then
(4) "Pegasus swims" is true,
is false, whereas
(5) Pegasus swims.
has no truth-value. Hence, (4) and (5) are not equivalent.
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Of the two contexts in which the truth-predicate occurs ineliminably, the second is by far
the more philosophically contentious. Most contemporary philosophers sympathetic to the
intuitions underlying the Redundancy Theory nonetheless accept that one function (or, as some
would have it, the primary function) of the truth-predicate is to allow us to express
generalizations.' It seems that one would have a reason to deny that the truth-predicate serves
such a function only if one believed that the truth-predicate did not express a property of
thoughts. But it nonetheless could be maintained that Frege, for some other reason, believed
the truth-predicate must always be capable of elimination,
One reason one might attribute the Redundancy Theory to Frege is because of the
occurrences of passages such as the following in Frege's writings:
One can, indeed, say: "The thought that 5 is a prime number is true," But closer
examination shows that nothing more has been said than in the simple sentence "5 is a
prime number" ([1970a], p. 64).
Thus, according to Frege, when "S" is replaced by a simple, declarative sentence that does not
lack a truth-value, the following sort of occurrences of the word 'true' are eliminable:
(6) The thought that S is true.
But of course such quotations do not imply that Frege held that the truth-predicate must
always be eliminable, For nothing is here implied about the use of the truth-predicate in
generalizations, or about the case in which S lacks a truth-value. That is, nothing is implied
about the cases that are of interest to us. Such passages are therefore irrelevant to the issue at
hand.19
l'8 E.g. philosophers who have advanced the "Disquotational Conception of Truth". For the
classic statement of this view, see pp, 10-13 of Quine [1970].
'
90f course Quine is an example of a philosopher who agrees with Frege here, yet is
perfectly content with ineliminable uses of the truth-predicate; "So long as we are speaking
only of the truth of singly given sentences, the perfect theory of truth is what Wilfrid Sellars
has called the disappearance theory of truth" ([1970], p. 1 ), and "By calling the sentence
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We have not come across any convincing arguments for ascribing the Redundancy Theory
to Frege, But even more damning is the fact that Frege's analysis of sentences that lack a
truth-value commits him to the view that the truth-predicate occurs ineliminably in the second,
and more disputed, context, For according to Frege, sentences containing non-referring singular
terms lack a truth-value. And it is also the case for Frege that if all parts of a sentence have
reference, then the sentence has a truth-value:
If a sentence has a meaning at all, this is either the True or the False, If a sentence can
be split up into parts, each of which is meaningful [bedeutungsvoll], then the sentence
also has a meaning.20
Thus, Frege held the following thesis:
Truth-Value Thesis: A sentence has a truth-value if and only if all of its parts have a
reference,
Hence, (5) has no truth-value. But (4) must have a truth-value, since the singular term in
subject position is a quote-name of a sentence, and hence is a referring expression,21 Therefore
(4) and (5) are not equivalent. Furthermore, according to Frege, sentences with non-referring
terms nonetheless express thoughts. Thus, we must also accept that:
(7) The thought that Pegasus swims is true
["Snow is white"] true, we call snow white" (Ibid,, p, 12),
20Frege, [1979a], p. 194. Here "meaning" is used for "Bedeutung". I use the term
"reference" instead.
21(4) must have a truth-value unless, of course, one wishes to deny that the predicate "is
true" has a reference. But if one took this line, then sentences such as "'Snow is white' is true"
would also lack a truth-value, since they also contain "is true" --which is, on this view, a non-
referring expression.
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has a truth-value, since the singular term "the thought that Pegasus swims" has a reference,
namely the thought expressed by the sentence, "Pegasus swims". Hence, (7) is also not
equivalent to (5).22
One might, however, take Frege's characterizations of judgement and assertion as
conflicting with Frege's Truth-Value Thesis, For, as we have seen, Frege's account of assertion
entails that asserting S is tantamount to asserting that S is true. This might be taken to imply
that (4), (5), and (7) are equivalent on the grounds that if (5) were asserted, then the thought
thereby expressed would be the same as the thought expressed by (4) and (7), Yet in order to
apply Frege's principles about assertion to conclude that (4), (5), and (7) are equivalent, we
must assume that (5) is capable of being asserted, But for Frege, sentences containing non-
referring singular terms, such as (5), cannot be asserted,
In order for a sentence to count as being asserted, it must be uttered with assertoric force,
Utterances made by actors lack the appropriate force, and hence do not count as assertions.23
Yet for Frege, the fact that a sentence is uttered with assertoric force is not a sufficient
condition for the utterance to count as an assertion. In addition, the sentence being uttered
must have a truth-value, As Frege writes in his article "Logic":
Instead of speaking of 'fiction', we could speak of 'mock thoughts'. Thus, if the sense
of an assertoric sentence is not true, it is either false or fictitious, and it will generally
be the latter if it contains a mock proper name.,..Assertions in fiction are not to be
taken seriously; they are only mock assertions ([1979a], p, 130).
22Most of this polemic is of course familiar from Michael Dummett's [1978].
23As Frege puts the point: "As stage thunder is only sham thunder and stage fight only a
sham fight, so stage assertion is only sham assertion," ([1984a], p. 356),
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Utterances of sentences that contain non-referring expressions, for Frege, are treated on a par
with utterances that lack assertoric force, Both types of utterances, according to Frege, are
instances offiction [Dichtung], and do not count as acts of assertion,24
Sentences that lack a truth-value cannot, according to Frege, be asserted.25 Frege's remarks
about assertion therefore do not imply the equivalence of (4), (5), and (7), and hence do not
conflict with his Truth-Value Thesis. We can safely conclude that Frege was committed to
ineliminable occurrences of the truth-predicate.
Now, it is standard interpretive practice to avoid attributing a contradictory position to a
philosopher. If Ricketts had uncovered powerful, clear reasons why we must ascribe to Frege
the Redundancy Theory of Truth, then we would be forced to conclude that Frege contradicted
himself in his analysis of meaningless names. However, in the absence of such evidence, the
interpretation which makes Frege's system a consistent, coherent whole must be chosen over
the interpretation which makes him an internally inconsistent philosopher.
Ricketts argues that to take (1) as a justification of the validity of Frege's rule of modus
ponens would commit Frege to denying the Redundancy Theory. Yet Ricketts fails to give
sufficiently good reasons for ascribing the Redundancy Theory to Frege. We are therefore left
without a convincing argument against taking (1) at face value, namely as a justification of the
24 As Frege writes: "But if my intention is not realized, if I only think I see without really
seeing, if on that account the designation 'That lime tree' is empty, then I have gone astray into
the sphere of fiction without knowing it or wanting to" ([1984a], p. 362), and similarly: "A
sentence containing a meaningless proper name is neither true nor false; if it expresses a
thought at all, then that thought belongs to fiction" ([1979a], p. 194).
25Although Frege's view that sentences with non-referring singular terms cannot be
asserted seems intuitively implausible, there are contemporary philosophers who have
advocated similar views. Gareth Evans, for instance, has argued at length for the thesis that to
utter a sentence containing a non-referring Russellian singular term (where this class, for
Evans, includes most proper names) is not, in fact, to make an assertion. See his [1982] for
details,
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validity of modus ponens. Yet aside from noting that (1) certainly appears to provide such a
justification, we have yet to give a positive reason for taking (1) in this manner. Although we
shall focus more directly on this issue in the next section, a few preliminary remarks can be
made here,
Logic, according to Frege, is the science of truth, As Frege writes, "...logic has much the
same relation to truth as physics has to weight or heat, To discover truths is the task of all
sciences; it falls to logic to discern the laws of truth.".26 Thus, the purpose of a rule of
inference is to encode a law of truth. Now, the goal of a justification of a logical system is to
convince us that the rules of inference and axioms of the system serve the purposes for which
they were intended, Thus, a Fregean justification of logic would have to provide a reason for
us to take the rules of inference of the Begriffsschrift as reflecting the laws of truth. And
calling our attention to the truth-preserving nature of the inference does just this,
"The laws of logic", asserts Frege, "ought to be guiding principles for thought in the
attainment of truth" ([1964], p. 12). By showing the reader of the Basic Laws that the rules of
inference of his formal system preserve truth, Frege is giving one reason to take the rules of
inference and axioms of the Begriffsschrift as laws of logic, But if (1) is indeed an attempt at a
metalinguistic justification of an inference rule, then Frege clearly resorted to the type of
"semantic metaperspective" whose existence Ricketts denies,
26[1984a], p. 351. Also: "I assign to logic the task of discovering the laws of truth...the
meaning of the word 'true' is spelled out in the laws of logic" (p,352), Similarly, "The word
'true' specifies the goal...The word 'true' characterizes logic" ([1979a], p. 126); "Logic is the
science of the most general laws of truth" (p. 128),
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Section III.
In the preceding section, we saw that there is no good reason for ascribing to Frege the
Redundancy Theory of Truth, First of all, when Frege gives the argument Ricketts cites as the
basis for this attribution, he actually draws the conclusion that truth is a primitivw, simple
property of thoughts, rather than the conclusion that truth is not a property of thoughts at all.
Hence, it is dubious that this argument can be used in support of Ricketts' position. Secondly,
if Ricketts were correct in his attribution, then, given Frege's commitment to ineliminable uses
of the truth-predicate, Ricketts' interpretation would show a deep inconsistency in Frege's
thought. Given standard interpretive practice, such attributions are to be avoided at all costs. In
this section, I turn to another possible argument for the thesis that Frege had no metatheory,
one stemming from considerations about the project of justifying logical laws.
As we have seen, Ricketts takes Frege's apparently semantical remarks to be what he calls
"elucidations", rather than semantical assertions. On this interpretation, Frege does not present
a semantic theory, but rather engages in a seperate project, called elucidation. Joan Weiner
presents this alternative interpretation as follows:
There are the early sections of the Begr(f/fsschrift, the early sections of each volume of
Basic Lawsw..,all of which appear to consist of explanations or justifications of the work
done in the language of Frege's systematic science. The justifications, in particular,
look to be metatheoretic proofs...Yet my aim...will be to argue that it follows from
Frege's general epistemological views that his discursive work has the status of
elucidation rather than of objective statement of facts ([1990], p. 229).
As one sees from this passage, "elucidations" are to be contrasted with what Weiner calls
"objective statements of fact". According to this alternative analysis, the purpose of
elucidations is not to "establish truths", or to give "objective arguments", but rather to yield
"some sort of prose gloss that will make the Bedeutung of the primitive term clear" (Weiner
[1990], p, 140).
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On this view, Frege's apparently semantical remarks are not inteilded to be assertions, This
account of Frege's apparently semantical claims parallels the account of ethical sentences given
by the metaethical thesis of emotivism. According to the emotivist, ethical utterances, despite
appearances to the contrary, are not assertions, and do not have "factual meaning", On such an
account of ethical sentences, ",,.in saying that a certain type of action is right or wrong, [one
is] not making any factual statement" (Ayer [1942], p. 107), According to the elucidation
account, Frege treats semantical sentences in a similar manner, In making what seem to be
semantical assertions, Frege is actually not attempting to state semantical facts at all, Rather,
he is elucidating the meaning of the Begriffsschrifi signs,
I do not claim to fully grasp the argument for "semantical emotivism", Emotivists typically
argue that ethical sentences cannot be taken as stating facts, since there are no ethical facts,
But a parallel argument in the case of semantics would not aid the elucidation position, For
even those dubious of the factivity of ordinary language talk of meaning and refelrnce, such as
Quine, are perfectly content to engage in explicitly semantical metatheoretic discourse. Indeed,
I fail to see how serious, assertive uses of a semantical metatheory would commit one to any
sort of ontologically or philosophically contentious position at all,
However, proponents of the elucidation position clearly believe otherwise, According to
them, there is some non-innocuous philosophical position to which one is committed by
serious, assertive uses of semantic theory. Their argument that Frege's remarks cannot be read
as semantical flows from their belief that Frege did not accept the non-innocuous philosophical
position in question, and hence could not have engaged in such theorizing. Though it is
dangerous to speculate about motivations for a view, I would like to suggest that such a
position results from a misconception about the nature of semantic theorizing,
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What is this non-innocuous philosophical position to which one is allegedly committed
when engaging in semantics? Those who advocate the elucidation interpretation are fond of
pointing out that Frege did not believe that one could give a non-circular justification of
logical laws, or infer such laws from truths of some other discipline, As Ricketts writes;
There is, as far as Frege is concerned, nothing to be said about the justification for our
recognition of these basic laws of logic to be truths..., Moreover, the maximal
generality of these laws precludes their inference on the basis of the truths of any
other discipline ([1986b], p, 81),
In accordance with this, I hazard that those who advance the elucidation interpretation of Frege
believe that the purpose of semantic theorizing is to provide some sort of non-circular
justification of logical laws -- some sort of "inference" of logical laws from other, perhaps
semantic, principles. Since Frege did not believe that such a justification was possible, then
Frege could not have engaged in semantical theorizing,
However, if this is the motivation for the elucidation interpretation of Frege, then it does
not even get off of the ground, For no one believes that it is possible to give completely non-
circular justifications of logical laws, and least of all those who engage in classical semantics.
A classical semantic theory does not help one to "infer" basic logical laws from truths of a
different sort: one typically assumes the laws to be proven in the metalanguage, 27 For instance,
a classical semantics which employs "absolutely straightforward stipulations" in the sense of
Dummett [1991a] does just this. 28 This is why classical soundness proofs are so trivial. It is
perfectly possible to engage in semantical reasoning without being at all committed to the
view that non-circular justifications of logical laws are possible. Furthermore, such a project
was never a motivation in the development of classical semantic theory.
27See Prawitz [1974] for discussion here.
28For instance, when Tarski proves Bivalence in Section III, theorem 2 of his [1983], he is
assuming the excluded middle in the metalanguage.
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Moreover, even proponents of non-classical semantic theories, such as Dummett, do not
believe a completely non-circular justification of fundamental logical laws to be possible.
Dummett, unlike many others, still holds out for the possibility of some sort of justification for
fundamental logical laws, Dummett's position here is controversial, and certainly not necessary
in order to engage in semantic theorizing. But even he thinks that the best possible
justifications of fundamental logical laws will at the very least be what he calls "pragmatically
circular". The debate here is not whether completely non-circular justifications of logical laws
could be given, justifications which would completely convince one who did not antecedently
accept them. It is rather about whether the circularity "deprives of all value any justification
that displays it", 29
Given the fact that one can engage in semantical theorizing without believing in the
possibility of non-circular justifications for logical laws, or the possibility of "inferring" such
laws from other, more basic truths, this argument for the elucidation interpretation of Frege
collapses. Let us thus turn to another, related argument for the elucidation interpretation, This
argument proceeds as follows, According to Frege, logic is applicable to any special science,
In particular, inferences in the special sciences are to be understood as instantiations of logical
laws to the vocabulary of that science, If there were a special science of semantics, then this
science would have to itself appeal to the principles of logic, Rather than standing apart from,
and justifying the system, it would have to appeal to the very features of the system it was
attempting to justify.
However, like the previous argument for the elucidation interpretation, this argument too
seems to suffer from a misconception about the nature of semantics. Contemporary semantics
for set theory is carried out with the use of set theory. This fact provides no obstacle to
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29Dummett [1991a], p. 202.
semantical theorizing about set theory. Why, then, should the fact that a parallel situation may
obtain in the case of semantical reasoning about Frege's system of logic prevent Frege from
engaging in such an endeavor?
The elucidation interpretation is worrisome for another reason. The function of elucidations
is to put the reader in a position to understand the Begriffsschrift notation (hence the term
"elucidation"), If the only apparently metatheoretic remarks occurring in Part I were the
soundness proofs for Frege's inference rules, then this construal might not be easily refutable,
For these passages come close to remarks one might make in trying to explain an
uninterpreted formalism to a layman. However, there are other apparently metatheoretic
remarks in Part I that clearly do not serve anything close to an elucidatory purpose.
To give a famous example, in §31, Frege attempts "to show that the proper names, and
names of first-level functions...always have a denotation". 30 In order to show this, Frege gives
a rather contorted argument, which involves an induction on the complexity of formulae of the
Begriffsschrift.3 It is difficult to see how this argument is of any help whatsoever in aiding
readers to come to a better understanding of the Begriffsschrift, To call such passages
"elucidations" not only vastly misdescribes their clarity, but fails to respect their status as
attempted arguments. Unless the proponents of the elucidation interpretation can arrive at a
more satisfactory account of the purpose of such passages, we must ascribe to them the
metatheoretic, justificatory purpose which they appear to embody.32
30Frege [1964], p. 87.
31As Dummett [1991b], p. 218, points out, such an induction has no hope of success in the
case of an impredicative second-order theory like that of the Basic Laws,
32In recent, yet to be published work, Ricketts has taken up this challenge (see his
[forthcoming]).
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According to the elucidation interpretation of Frege, Frege could not have engaged in
metatheory, because he did not believe that logical laws could be inferred from more basic
truths, However, in order for this reasoning to hold, it must be the case that the purpose of
metatheory is to infer logical laws from more basic truths, Since this is a false conception of
the purpose of semantical reasoning, this argument for the elucidation interpretation fails,
If the purpose of a semantic metatheory is not to infer logical laws from more basic truths,
then in what sense can a semantical metatheory serve to justify these laws? This is one of the
most difficult and important questions of contemporary philosophy of logic, However, what I
have been suggesting is that it is a question which would be just as relevant for Frege as it is
for Tarski, In the next section, I shall turn to a brief discussion of the sort of answer Frege
would give,
Section IV.
Now, there are occurrences of Frege's truth-predicate in the exposition of the
Begriffsschrift apart from the sections in which inference rules are introduced, Typically, these
other occurrences appear alongside uses of Frege's other apparently semantical term, "denote",
in passages which seem to serve the purpose of giving an interpretation to the Begriffsschrifl.
In this section, I wish to argue briefly that one central reason Frege gave an interpretation to
his formal language was to justify the axioms and rules of inference of his formal theory, I
hope thereby to emphasize the importance Frege attached to providing a metatheoretical
justification of his formal theory,
In Part III of the Basic Laws, Frege objects to "Formalist arithmetic", according to which
no interpretation is given to the signs of a formal system. According to Frege, such an
approach to arithmetic fails to account for its applications. Consider, for instance, a natural
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scientist, who wishes to use some formal theory of arithmetic in her work. How can she be
sure that the theory of arithmetic in question will be useful in her application of it to natural
phenomena? According to Frege, the scientist must believe that the axioms of the formal
theory actually express true thoughts, and that the rules of inference are actually truth-
preserving. For only such a theory of arithmetic will be able to be usefully applied to natural
phenomenon.
But what justifies the scientist's belief? The formalist has not provided any reasons to take
the axioms of his formal theory as actually expressing true thoughts, or the rules as actually
truth-preserving. The sole concern of the formalist is derivability within a system with some
set of axioms and some rules of inference. The justification of the axioms and rules of
inference is, for the formalist, not at issue. And clearly, it is not the task of the natural
scientist to provide such a justification. Thus, the task of justifying the rules of inference and
axioms of the formal theory "falls into a void between the sciences" ([1970b], §92),
The justification of the rules of inference and axioms of a formal system of arithmetic,
according to Frege, must be carried out by the arithmetician himself. Only by providing such
a justification can the arithmetician take himself as accounting for the application of his formal
theory of arithmetic to the special sciences. And it is here that sense and reference gain their
importance:
In order to bridge [the gulf between arithmetical formulas and their applications], it is
necessary that formulas express a sense and that the rules be grounded in the reference
of the signs ([1970b], §92),
The role of sense and reference is thus to help justify the axioms and rules of inference of the
formal system, and thereby to account for the applications of the formal theory of arithmetic.
To fail to do so is to "exclude from arithmetic what it needs in order to be a science"
([1970b], §91),
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Frege's remarks about arithmetic hold, of course, mulatis mutandis for logic. For Frege's
discussion of formal theories of arithmetic concerns the necessity of justifying the rules of
inference of a formal theory of arithmetic, But the rules of inference of any formal theory of
arithmetic, such as the, formal theory of arithmetic given in Frege's Basic Laws, are the same
rules of inference that occur in any standard system of logic. Thus Frege's repeated insistence
upon the need for a justification of a formal theory of arithmetic carries over directly to a
demand for a justification of the basic inferences of any system of logic,
By assigning sense and reference to the expressions of a formal system, one helps
determine whether the axioms of the system are true, and the rules truth-preserving.
Furthermore, it is clear that Frege believed that assigning sense and reference was the only
way to provide such a justification:
[The cognitive purpose of arithmetic] requires the character of the rules to be such that
if in accordance with them a sentence is derived from true sentences, the new sentence
will also be true, Whether the rules satisfy this condition can, of course, be
determined only after the signs have been given a reference ([1970b], §104),
Frege's point is clear enough, Remarks such as (1) only demonstrate that the rule of inference
is truth-preserving if the condition-stroke sign has been given the appropriate interpretation.
Thus, we need to assign an interpretation to the condition-stroke in order to demonstrate the
truth-preserving character of the relevant rule of inference,
We can thus take ourselves to have established the role of sense and reference, as well as
the importance they play in Frege's conception of logic. Without assigning sense and reference
to the expressions of the formal theory, there would be no way to tell whether the axioms are
true, and the rules truth-preserving, and hence for remarks such as those found in (1) to
accomplish their intended task. But in order to account for the applicability of logic, we must
provide reasons to take the axioms and the rules of inference of our system of logic as true, or
truth-preserving. Finally, since applicability is what lifts logic and arithmetic to the status of a
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science, not to account for the applicability of logic and arithmetic is tantamount to not
justifying its status as a science.
Part I of the Basic Laws corroborates the vital role we have granted a semantic theory in
Frege's system. For it seems that Frege, in introducing his formal theory, is simultaneously
giving its interpretation. Each introduction of a primitive symbol of the Begriffsschrift is
always accompanied by an explanation of the conditions under which a sentence containing it
denotes the true. One example is Frege's introduction of the condition-stroke in § 12:
In order to enable us to designate the subordination of a concept under a concept, and
other important relations, I introduce the function of two arguments:
mA
by stipulating that its value shall be the False if the True be taken as /-argument and
any object other than the True be taken as ý-argument, and that in all other cases the
value of the function shall be the true.
Another example is Frege's introduction of the sign for equality in §7 of the Basic Laws:
"F=1A" shall denote the True if F is the same as A; in all other cases it shall denote the
False.
As with the occurrence of the truth-predicate in the description of the rules of inference, it is
difficult to take these occurrences of the truth-predicate as anything but semantical,
Frege's use of the term 'denote' also seems to be in the service of giving a semantic theory
for the formal language of the Basic Laws, For instance, in § 11, where Frege introduces the \
operator:
"\t~(E)" denotes the object falling under the concept D(4) if Q(D) is a concept under
which falls one and only one object; in all other cases "\WP(e)" denotes the same as
He is evidently telling the reader what object corresponds to the expression '\I(E)'.
Furthermore, when Frege himself introduces the term in §2 of the Basic Laws -the very
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beginning of the work- it is unambiguously characterized as a relation between words and
things:
...the name "22" denotes the number four. Accordingly I call the number four the
denotation of "4" and "22"..
The view that Frege is laying down an interpretation of his formal system by giving a method
for determining the truth-conditions of each of its sentences is further reinforced by Frege's
own remarks about these passages:
...by our stipulations it is determined under what conditions [each name of a truth-
value] denotes the true. The sense of this name -the thought- is the thought that these
conditions are fulfilled.33
Let us now return to the question we raised at the end of the last section. In what sense
does giving an interpretation of one's formal language justify the rules of inference and axioms
of a theory couched in that language? Now, Frege's conception of formal theory is, I believe,
remarkably modern. As we saw above, Frege speaks of the project of giving signs reference.
This suggests that Frege had the contemporary conception of a logic as a set of syntactic
operations on strings of symbols. The project of giving signs reference justifies the syntactic
manipulations performed on these symbols by ensuring that they express basic inference rules
such as Modus Ponens, which Frege is already assuming we accept,
There is, of course, another sense of justification in which the use of a semantical
metatheory can justify a particular system of logic. For instance, one can prove, with the use
of semantical techniques, that a particular system possesses some desirable semantic property,
such as categoricity, completeness, or consistency, In the next section, I shall turn to the
3[1964], p. 90. Note the remarkable similarity between Frege's comments about his
semantic theory and some of Tarski's comments about his definition of Truth: "...through the
theorems obtained, the meaning of the corresponding expressions of the type 'xeTr' become
intelligible and unambiguous" ([1983], p, 197),
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question of how Frege would have understood these methods of justifying a system by
semantical means.
Section V.
In Part I of the Grundgesetze, Frege's truth-predicate is not relativized to a domain, Frege
did not read his quantified Begriffsschrift sentences as true or false relative to varying domains
of objects. Instead, Frege took the quantifiers in such sentences to range over all entities of the
appropriate logical type. In this section, I will try to draw out the consequences of this feature
of Frege's semantics.
The sentences in Frege's Begriffsschrift are not to be subject to varying interpretations.
Their meaning is fixed from the outset, via the semantical stipulations laid down in Part I of
the Grundgeselze, Tarski's semantic characterization of logical consequence, and its limiting
case, the semantic characterization of logical truth, did not occur to Frege. This situation raises
three questions, The first question is whether this fact implies that no interesting
metatheoretical results could be proven within Frege's semantical framework. The second
question is whether Frege would have understood model theoretic techniques. The final
question is the hardest. It is whether Frege would have accepted the model-theoretic definition
of consequence as a good definition of logical consequence, or whether there is some feature
of his philosophy which would cause him to reject it.
The first question is easily answerable. Even within an "absolute" semantics, interesting
semantic questions can be raised. For instance, if one gives the intended interpretation for the
theory, and proves that the axioms of the theory are, in that interpretation, true, and the rules
truth-preserving, then one has given a semantic proof of the consistency of the system. Indeed,
it is just this that Frege is attempting in §31 of the Grundgesetze. This is a substantial, non-
37
trivial attempt at metatheory. Furthermore, one does not need varying interpretations in order
to prove it, If the intended interpretation is a model for the theory, then it follows that the
theory has a model, and is hence consistent.
One might object that Frege's universalist conception of logic would bar him from
accepting such a result as a consistency proof. For the proof may have to be carried out either
within the theory of the Grundgesetze, or by assuming the reasoning which the system
codifies. However, such an objection would be confused. It was not until Gotdel's second
incompleteness theorem that it was known that a consistency proof for a system cannot be
carried out within that system, And contemporary semantic consistency proofs for fragments of
logic or set-theory also assume, in the metalanguage, the reasoning which they are attempting
to justify. Frege's conception of logic thus places him in a situation no different from that of
the contemporary logician,
In conclusion, though certainly not all metatheoretical results can be proven within the
framework of an absolute semantics, there are some which can, What the limitations of such a
semantics are seems to me to be an interesting question, one which can only be answered by
investigating logico-semantical practice, What about the second question? Would Frege have
understood model-theoretic techniques? The best way to see why the answer to this must be in
the affirmative is to consider Frege's own logical and mathematical writings,
It is clear from even a cursory reading of the Grundgesetze that some of the techniques
which we now would classify as model-theoretic are exploited by Frege. Consider, for
example, Theorem 263 of the Grundgesetze. This theorem states that:
Endlos [i.e., the number of natural numbers] is the number which belongs to a
concept, if the objects falling under this concept may be ordered in a series, which
begins with a certain object and continues without end, without coming back on itself
and without branching (Frege [1966], §144),
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In order to prove this theorem, Frege constructs an isomorphism between any such series, and
the series of natural numbers, If, as Heck [1993] has argued, it is correct to view these
conditions as characterizing Frege's axioms of arithmetic, then Frege has essentially shown that
any series satisfying these conditions could, in ý:ome sense, serve as the natural numbers. In
other words, Frege here essentially proves the categoricity of his system of axioms, which is a
classical model theoretic result.
Whether Frege took himself as having proven a result of this kind is another question. But
it is obvious that Frege was aware of the relevant mathematical techniques. Furthermore, as
has been stressed by Tappenden [forthcoming], Frege was also aware of the developments in
geometry which we were taking place in the latter half of the 19th century, some of which
involved arriving at reinterpretations of systems of geometrical axioms. Frege was hence quite
familiar with what we now call model-theoretic techniques,
What about the third question? Would Frege accept the model-theoretic characterization of
logical consequence? If not, then there are model-theoretic results which would not, for him,
have the foundational importance that they do for some of us. Let me say at the outset that I
think that the negative answer to this question, which has been espoused in unpublished work
and lecture by Burton Dreben, is the only claim which can be retained from this recent trend
in Frege-interpretation. However, in part, this is due to its vagueness. As far as I can tell, any
interesting interpretation of it seems to make it massively underdetermined by the textual
evidence, whereas the most uninteresting interpretation, that Frege was simply unfamiliar with
the characterization, is trivially true.
Here is one reason one might think that the contemporary characterization of logical truth
would be anathema to the project of logicism. Surely there are possible domains with only
finite cardinality. However, in order to construct the series of natural numbers, and in
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particular, for the proof that every number has a successor, one needs logical principles which
guarantee the existence of an infinite domain. If so, then logicism requires certain existence
statements to be considered as logical truths. This may be thought to be inconsistent with the
model-theoretic conception of logical truth, since no interesting existence claims can be logical
truths on this picture.
However, I do not find this consideration compelling. Suppose, pert impossibile, that naive
set theory were consistent. In this case, we might consider the axioms of set-theory as logical
axioms, and the vocabulary of set-theory as logical vocabulary, and hence not subject to
reinterpretation. If so, then we, too, would consider certain existence claims to be logical
truths. But we could still use the model-theoretic definition of consequence, The domains we
would consider would all contain the logical objects, but would differ from one another in the
nature and number of the other elements,
I am not aware of any other possible technical incompatibility between model theory and
logicism. However, there may be some aspect of Frege's thought which would cause him to
view the model theoretic characterization of validity as a poor analysis of the ordinary notion,
If so, then Frege would be in agreement with contemporary philosophers of logic such as
Etchemendy, though presumably for different reasons. This would be an important finding, if
true. The discovery of any good reason for rejecting the model-theoretic characterizations of
informal metalogical notions would be an important contribution to philosophy. Since Frege's
reasons are generally particularly good, we can conclude that if scholarship can unveil reasons
why Frege would reject Tarski's characterization of logical consequence, then, modulo the
degree of persuasiveness of the reasons, this would certainly count as an important
contribution to the philosophy of logic,
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One way to obtain the conclusion that Frege would have rejected the model-theoretic
characterization of informal semantical notions is to argue that Frege would have rejected any
form of semantics whatsoever, that semantical concepts are, for Frege, illegitimate, as are all
seraantical questions about a system. If this were true, it would be disappointing. For most of
us, it is improbable that we will ever be convinced of the illegitimacy of semantic concepts.
However, we are generally less-attached to the model-theoretic characterization thereof. Thus,
if Frege would have rejected the model-theoretic characterization of semantical notions for the
reasons given by Ricketts, then his rejection is less interesting, and less relevant, then had it
been based on more model-theory specific ones.
I do not know whether there is some feature of Frege's philosophy which would cause him
to reject the model-theoretic characterization of semantical notions, But if there is, it is, for the
reasons given in this paper, certainly not that he viewed semantical endeavors as illegitimate,
Of course, given that Frege was interested in semantical questions, he obviously would be
impressed by the perspicuity with which model-theory treats them. Thus, I suspect that Frege,
like us, would be inclined on pragmatic grounds to take the model-theoretic characterizations
as legitimate representations of our informal semantic notions. However, a suspicion is not an
argument, and a resolution of this question awaits further research,34
'Thanks especially to George Boolos, Richard Cartwright, and Richard Heck for
numerous detailed discussions, criticisms, and helpful suggestions. Burton Dreben's input has
aided immensely, and he also deserves special thanks, Discussions with Thomas Ricketts have
occasioned substantial and important changes, and I wish to thank him for his intellectual
objectivity, interest, and patience. Thanks also to Michael Glanzburg, Daryl Jung, Kathrin
Koslicki, Sanford Shieh, and Jamie Tappenden,
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Frege's Thesis
From its introduction, in 1891, to Frege's final writings, the notion of sense plays several
distinct roles, I will concentrate on what I take to be the two key roles Sense has in Frege's
writings. The first is that of providing an explanation of terms' having the referents they do;
or, as shall call it here, the reference-fixing role of sense. The second is that of serving as the
object of understanding. The sense of an expression is what a speaker knows, in virtue of
which she counts as understanding, or being linguistically competent with, that expression,
Let us call the thesis that one notion can play both of these roles, Frege's Thesis, Frege's
thesis has been severely criticized. According to Kripke, for example, "Frege should be
criticized for using the term 'sense' in two senses. For he takes the sense of a designator to be
its meaning; and he also takes it to be the way its reference is determined", 2 In particular, it is
felt that considerations of proper names and natural kind terms provide clear refutations of
Frege's thesis, I wish, in this paper, to respond to these worries.
In Section 1, I discuss the nature of the two roles which Frege attributes to Sense, I then
draw two major consequences of Frege's Thesis, In Section II, I defend the first of these
consequences: that a term in the language of a given speech community refers to an object in
virtue of true beliefs competent speakers in the community have about that object. In Section
'I thus ignore the role of sense as providing a criterion for the success of analytic
definitions in mathematics, most prominently displayed in Gottlob Frege, "Logic in
Mathematics", in his Posthumous Writings, ed, by H. Hermes, et al., (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 203-250, first published in 1914, Though I will not argue the point
here, I am in agreement with Dummett that this latter notion of sense is incompatible with
other, more central ones.
2Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 59,
Henceforth "NN".
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III, I defend the second of these consequences: that full understanding of a term requires non-
trivial, uniquely identifying knowledge of its referent,
I,
As is well known, Frege sharply distinguishes between the reference [Bedeutung] of an
expression and its sense [Sinn]., The reference of a singular term, for Frege, was the object it
denoted; the reference of a predicate, the concept it denoted; and the reference of a sentence,
its truth-value.3 Quantifiers, sentential connectives and the like are, on this account, taken to
refer to functions of the appropriate sorts.
When Frege gave what was arguably the first semantic theory, in Part I of his Basic Laws
of Arithmetic, his semantic clauses did not link expressions to the senses they express. Rather,
their purpose was to assign referents of the appropriate sort.4 Thus, for Frege, as for Davidson,
a semantic theory is fundamentally a theory of reference. By the semantic value of an
expression e, I shall mean whatever entity is assigned to e via the axioms or theorems of some
semantic theory, For Frege, truth-values, rather than thoughts, are the semantic value of
sentences, and the person John, rather than the sense of the name "John", is the semantic value
of "John", Though Frege does, in his informal philosophical writings, suggest that senses can
3It has recently become common to use the term "concept" as a name for the mode of
presentation of a property, rather than the property itself. Though 1 endorse this terminological
move for contemporary discussions, it does have the propensity to engender nefarious
misreadings of Frege, as this is certainly not how Frege used the term. See Frege's letter to
Husserl of 5/24/1891, in Gottlob Frege, Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, ed,
by G. Gabriel, tr. by H. Kaal (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
4See my "Truth and Metatheory in Frege" for a defense of the claim that the theory
outlined in Part I of Gottlob Frege, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (Hildesheim: Georg Olms,
1966) is a semantic theory in the modern sense,
46
serve as semantic values in non-extensional contexts, nowhere in his technical presentations
does he exploit them as such.
This fact raises an important question about the place of Sense in Frege's philosophy. If,
as I believe to be the case, senses, for Frege, are not fundamentally intended to serve as
semantic values, what then is their purpose? In the remainder of this section, I shall address
this difficult question. The purpose of this discussion is to arrive at a clearer understanding of
the two roles of sense invoked in Frege's Thesis.
Before we begin our discussion of the two roles of Sense, I would like to make one
caveat. Frege's Thesis is thought to be refutable on the basis of considerations stemming from
proper names and natural kind terms,5 Thus, to focus our discussion, I shall restrict myself, in
the remainder of this paper, to expressions of these types. The referents and senses of
descriptions, predicates, and sentences are thus not at issue here.
With David Kaplan, let us distinguish between semantical questions and metasernantical
questions.6 Semantics is the project of assigning semantic values to expressions. Accordingly,
semantical issues are those concerning which semantic values particular expressions, or
categories of expressions, should receive, and their relation to the semantic values of simpler
expressions (if any) of which they are composed. Metasemantical questions concern rather
foundational metaphysical or epistemological questions about semantic theory.
5
"Proper name" is here used in the contemporary sense, rather than Frege's, Thus,
descriptions and sentences will not count as proper names.
6See David Kaplan, "Afterthoughts", in J. Almog, et al,, eds., Themes From Kaplan
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 565-614, p. 573 ff. Robert Stalnaker, in his
"Reference and Necessity" (forthcoming), calls this the distinction between descriptive and
foundational semantics, and Martin Davies, in his Meaning. Quantification. and Necessity
(Boston : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), calls it the distinction between "Theories of
meaning 1" and "Theories of meaning 2", Despite being less sonorous than Stalnaker's
terminology, I prefer Kaplan's to these alternatives, as metasemantics stands to semantics in
much the same way that metaethics stands to ethics.
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Its use as a referent in propositional attitude contexts notwithstanding, the sense of an
expression is not primarily a semantical notion.? Sense, for Frege, is fundamentally a
metasemantical notion, invoked to answer two metasemantical questions. The first,
epistemological question concerns knowledge of semantical facts; given a semantical fact, such
as that "water" refers to water, what are the conditions under which one knows that semantical
fact? In more pre-theoretic terms, this is the question of what it is in virtue of which a speaker
counts as understanding the relevant expression, The second, metaphysical question concerns
the nature of semantical facts: given a semantical fact, such as that "water" refers to water,
what explains this fact, i.e., what is it in virtue of which it is true? The first of these questions
is how Frege would formulate the notion of linguistic meaning. The second is the foundational
question of reference-fixing. 8
The distinction between semantics and metasemantics is analogous to the distinction
between Ethics and Metaethics, Suppose, for argument's sake, that there are ethical facts, and
that they correspond to true ethical utterances. Then presumably (1) states such a fact:
(1) Torturing babies for fun or profit is wrong,
7The idea of sense as a metasemantic notion has its roots in the writings of Michaal
Dummett's Frege: Philosophy of Language (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1973), as
well as John McDowell, "On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name", Mind 76 (1977),
pp, 159-85, and Gareth Evans, "Understanding Demonstratives", in his Collected Papers
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp, 291-321, esp. §2.
8Before we proceed, a brief caveat about the relation of Sense to metasemantic questions
must be raised, As I will suggest, sense is intended to explain two metasemantical questions:
what is it in virtue of which a speaker knows semantic facts, and what is it in virtue of which
an expression has the reference it does. However, this leaves open two other questions: what is
it in virtue of which a speaker knows that an expression has the sense that it does, and what is
it in virtue of which an expression has the sense that it does. A complete answer to the
foundational questions of understanding and reference-fixing must also incorporate an answer
to these latter questions. In a more expanded version of this paper, I argue tlat there are no
substantive philosophical issues raised by such metasemantical questions about sense.
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Two metaethical issues arise here, First, there is the metaphysical metaethical issue: what is it
in virtue of which (1) is true? That is, what is it in virtue of which torturing babies for fun or
profit is wrong? Second, there is the epistemological metaethical question: what does one have
to know in order to know (1)? That is, what does one have to know in order to know that
torturing babies for fun or profit is wrong?
Let us now turn to the distinction between semantic and metasemantic issues, For Frege, a
semantic theory is a theory of reference, a recursive assignment of referents to expressions
which yields, for each sentence in the language, a statement of the conditions under which it
refers to the True. Among the axioms of a Fregean semantic theory for English would be
something of the form:
(2) Ref("Bill Clinton") = Bill Clinton
(2) states a semantical fact about English. Accordingly, two metasemantic questions arise, The
first is the metaphysical metasemantic question: what is it in virtue of which (2) is true? That
is, what is it in virtue of which the name "Bill Clinton" refers to Bill Clinton? The second is
the epistemological metasemantic question; what does one have to know in order to know (2)?
That is, what does one have to know in order to know that "Bill Clinton" refers to Bill
Clinton?
We now must turn to the question how sense can resolve these two metasemantical issues.
First of all, consider the metaphysical metasemantic issue: what is it in virtue of which (2) is
true? For Frege, this question is answered by appeal to sense: (2) is true in virtue of the fact
that "Bill Clinton" expresses the sense it does. 9
Let us now turn to the epistemological metasemantic issue: what must a speaker know in
order to know that "Bill Clinton" refers to Bill Clinton? According to Frege, what a speaker
9How sense answers the metaphysical question is an issue which cannot be addressed here!
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must know in order to know that "Bill Clinton" refers to Bill Clinton, is the Sense of the name
"Bill Clinton". Stated in more pretheoretic terminology, in order to count as understanding the
name "Bill Clinton", or as being linguistically competent with this term, one must, according
to Frege, know its Sense.
It is important to understand exactly what is controversial about Frege's Thesis. For
instance, some may think that Frege's assumption that there is an epistemological
metasemantic question at all in the case of proper names or natural kind terms is already
contentious. According to this line of thought, there is nothing to a proper name or natural
kind term over and above its referent. Let us pause here to evaluate this objection to Frege.
The first thing to note about this objection is its lack of clarity. What is it to claim that
there is nothing to a proper name or natural kind term over and above its referent? One
construal of this claim could be that there is nothing one needs to know in order to understand
such an expression, However, if this is the import of the thesis, then it seems false, Someone
who does not know that "Boston" refers to a city, or that "water" refers to a liquid, does not
understand the terms, A denial of such facts is tantamount to a refusal to take talk of
understanding or linguistic competence seriously.
Another construal of the claim that there is nothing to a proper name or natural kind term
over and above its referent is that all one needs to know in order to understand such an
expression is the relevant clause in the theory of reference. On this construal, the only
explanation for why someone understands an expression such as "water" is that they know that
"water" refers to water. However, this construal too misses the metasemantical questions.
Consider an analogy to ethics. We may explain the fact that John does not kill Harry, even
if he loathes him, and could easily get away with the crime, by attributing to John the
knowledge that to kill Harry would be wrong. However, in so doing, we have not addressed
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any metaethical issues. Metaethics enters at the point where we ask what it is in virtue of
which John counts as knowing the ethical fact that to kill Harry would be wrong. Similarly,
metasemantics enters in at the point where we ask what it is in virtue of which someone
counts as knowing the semantical fact that "water" refers to water.
A full consideration of the position that there is nothing to a proper name or natural kind
term over and above its referent would require a separate paper. However, my suspicion is that
some arguments in support of this position suffer from a failure to grasp the distinction
between semantics and metasemantics. For instance, such arguments sometimes seem to be
motivated by the following assumption: if there were something to a name or natural kind
term over and above its referent, then a semantic theory for a language containing such
expressions would have to assign them entities distinct from their referents as their semantic
values. These arguments then establish that candidate semantic value assignments distinct from
referents result in a flawed semantic theory.' 0
But such arguments clearly result from a failure to grasp the distinction between semantics
and metasemantics. For they are motivated by the assumption that any answer to the
epistemological metasemantical question for a particular term must state the semantic value of
that term. But with the semantics/metasemantics distinction in mind, it is evident that this
assumption is unwarranted.
Fundamentally, then, what should be considered controversial about Frege's Thesis is not
that it assumes that there is some answer to the epistemological metasemantical question in the
case of proper names and natural kind terms. Rather, what should be controversial about the
Thesis is that it assumes that one and the same notion can specify what it is in virtue of which
1lThe classic argument of this form is Kripke's modal argument in Lecture I of HN,
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a term has the reference that it does, as well as specify what a speaker must know in order to
be linguistically competent with that term.
To see why Frege's Thesis is controversial, consider a widely held picture of the
reference-fixing of proper names and natural kind terms: the causal theory. According to this
view, the explanation for "Bill Clinton'"s referring to Bill Clinton is that there is a causal
chain linking the name "Bill Clinton" to Bill Clinton. However, this picture is inconsistent
with Frege's Thesis. For a causal chain could not possibly be what a speaker know in virtue of
which they count as linguistically competent with the name "Bill Clinton". Causal chains are
not intended to be objects of knowledge. Thus, Frege's view that one notion both explains
reference-fixing as well as linguistic competence rules out the causal theory as a possible
answer to the reference-fixing metasemantic question,
In fact, Frege's Thesis has quite substantive consequences for both the theory of reference-
fixing and the theory of understanding. Consider first its major consequence for the theory of
reference-fixing. The sense of a term specifies what speakers competent with it know in virtue
of which they count as understanding that term. This implies that a fact about the referent of
the term can only serve as part of its Sense if it plays some role in the explanation of what it
is in virtue of which speakers count as understanding, or being linguistically competent, with
that term. If no speaker knows the fact in question, then it is difficult to see how that fact
enters into an account of how speakers successfully communicate with the use of that term.
Thus, a constraint on a piece of information counting as specifying the Sense of a term is that
the information be known by at least some of the competent users of that term in the
community. But since the sense of a term also provides the explanation of a term's having the
referent it does, this implies that the facts in virtue of which a term has the referent it does
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must be known by at least some speakers in the community. Let us call this the first
consequence of Frege's Thesis.
The first consequence of Frege's Thesis is a result of the pressure placed on the reference-
fixing role of sense by the requirement that it serve the purposes of the role of sense as
providing an explanation of linguistic competence. The second consequence, on the other hand,
follows from the strain put on the latter role of sense by the requirement that it fix reference.
Since the Sense of a term serves as the explanation of a tenn's having the referent it does, in
order to count as linguistically competent with that term, a speaker must know what it is in
virtue of which the term has the referent it does." Thus, Frege's Thesis implies that linguistic
competence with a term requires non-trivial, uniquely identifying knowledge of the referent of
the term. 12 Let us call this the second consequence of Frege's Thesis. In the next two sections,
I will turn to a defense of these consequences.
II.,
If central aspects of what fixes reference must serve in an account of what a speaker
knows who understands an expression, then, given the plausible thesis that each aspect of the
meaning of an expression is known by some speakers in the community, Frege's Thesis
implies that, for each term, there are speakers in the community who know the conditions
something must satisfy in order to be its referent. Thus, if reference succeeds, it does so in
virtue of true beliefs held by members of a speech community. In this section, I shall defend
"Or, as, for example, Christopher Peacocke would put it, understanding a term amounts to
knowing what it is for something to be its referent. See his A Study of Concepts (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1992; especially 1.3, 2.4,
12See Kripke's discussion of Condition C (p, 71ff. of NN) for a statement and explanation
of the non-triviality requirement.
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this consequence against several objections, I hope thereby to show that it is not as
controversial as is traditionally believed,
Frege's Thesis implies that reference is fixed by speakers' beliefs, In itself, this is not
controversial. For theories which presuppose that a word refers partly in virtue of the
referential intentions of its competent users also have the consequence that reference is, at least
partly, a matter of speaker's beliefs, In order to have the intention to do something, I must
have certain beliefs, I cannot have the intention to buy something at the store at 2 p.m,, unless
I believe that it is open at 2 p.m,. Thus, such theories also presuppose that a correct account of
the reference relation must invoke speakers' beliefs, However, Frege's Thesis implies
something stronger than this, It implies that reference is fixed entirely by speakers' beliefs.
Objections to the first consequence of Frege's Thesis stem from the view that it results in
a notion of reference that depends too heavily upon the beliefs of individual speakers.
Phenomena such as linguistic deference are taken to show that a use of a word by a given
speaker can refer to an object, despite the fact that that speaker's beliefs would "individuate"
another object, or would fail to individuate an object at all. I shall first show that the existence
of one type of linguistic deference, which I shall call social deference, is predicted by the
identification of the two aspects of sense. I shall then turn to a discussion of another type of
deference, namely deference to the world. This sort of deference is indeed incompatible with
Frege's Thesis, I will suggest that, to the extent to which the phenomena which deference to
the world is intended to capture exist, they are describable in terms consistent with Frege's
Thesis,
Here is an obvious fact about language. A speaker of a language can use a term of that
language to refer to an object despite that speaker's lack of individuating knowledge, or even
minimally true beliefs, about the object in question. If a person who is quite misinformed
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about Mars, believing it to be a star, utters the sentence "Mars is not a planet", she has spoken
falsely. We do not, in general, cast about for an alternative reference for her utterance of
"Mars" which makes that utterance true, Similarly, someone who knows nothing about Mars
may ask, "What is Mars?" That is, someone with no knowledge of the referent of a term may
nonetheless use that term to refer to that object in speech acts such as questions and assertions.
In sum, a speaker can refer to an object without knowing that her term designates an object of
the appropriate type.
The phenomena which concern us are thus those in which speakers seem to refer to an
object with a term, despite the lack of individuating knowledge of that object. We can divide
the phenomena into two classes. The first class concerns cases in which the speaker in
question does not count as an "expert" with the term she utters; that is, she does not count as
knowing the meaning of the term. Instances in which non-experts with a term successfully
refer to an object despite their lack of individuating knowledge will be called instances of
social deference. The second class of cases concerns those in which experts with a given term
seem to refer to an object, despite the fact that the total knowledge of experts fails to be
individuating. Instances of this second class will be called instances of deference to the world.
Let us first consider the phenomenon of social deference. Social deference is a
phenomenon that is consistent with the first consequence of Frege's Thesis. For according to
this consequence, what fixes the reference of a term is the meaning of that term, But the
meaning of a term is constituted by a subset of commonly accepted beliefs held by competent
users of that term in the community. Thus, the only beliefs that count as relevant to fixing the
reference of a term are those held by competent users of that term in the community. The
beliefs of a non-competent user of a term are simply irrelevant to deciding the reference of
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that tenn, Frege's Thesis predicts that reference-fixing is not sensitive to the beliefs of non-
competent users. Hence, it predicts the existence of social deference.,
The case of deference to the world is more problematic for Frege's Thesis, Indeed, a
genuine case of deference to the world would serve as a straightforward counterexample to the
first consequence of Frege's Thesis, For if a term can refer to an object, despite the lack of
individuating knowledge on the part of its competent users in the community, then certainly it
cannot be that the beliefs of the competent users are what actually serve to fix the reference of
that term.
The classic purported instance of deference to the world stems from Strawson's seminal
discussion of massive reduplication in Chapter 1 of Individuals, The moral of Strawson's case
can be taken to be that experts' knowledge about the referent of a term could fail to
distinguish that object from another object, removed in space or time, without affecting the
relation of reference, That is, such cases seems to suggest that a term t can refer to an object
O, even when experts in the community do not have individuating knowledge of O,
Strawson expresses the worry quite clearly in the following passage:
...it may seem, in the non-demonstrative identification of particulars, we depend
ultimately on description in general terms alone. Now one may be very well informed
about a particular sector of the universe, One may know beyond any doubt that there
is only one particular thing or person in that sector which answers to a certain general
description. But this, it might be argued, does not guarantee that the description applies
uniquely. For there might be another particular, answering to the same description, in
another sector of the universe, Even if one enlarges the description so that it
incorporates a description of the salient features of the sector of the universe
concerned, one still lacks a guarantee that the description individuates. For the other
sector might reproduce these features too, However much one adds to the description
of the sector one knows about-its internal detail and its external relations-this
possibility of massive reduplication remains open. No extension of one's knowledge of
the world can eliminate this possibility. So, however extensive the speaker's
3To my knowledge, this is first pointed out in Gareth Evans' "The Causal Theory of
Names", in Collected Papers, pp. 1-24,
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knowledge and however extensive the hearer's, neither can know that the former's
identifying description in fact applies uniquely,' 4
Strawson's version of the massive reduplication argument is given in terms of spatial location,
But a similar argument could be given on the temporal dimension, For it could be that the
current state of our world exactly reduplicates a previous time-slice of it, For example, it could
have been that some natural disaster completely wiped off the face of the planet some very
advanced civilization that mirrored our own in every respect, Any purportedly uniquely
identifying description, given in purely qualitative terms, would then fail to individuate due to
the existence of qualitatively identical particulars existing in the previous time-slice of our
world.
However, as Strawson points out, such arguments only demonstrate deference to the world
if it is allowed that the contents of beliefs of experts can only be individuated by purely
qualitative, general descriptions.15 Now, one might believe this is the case, if one holds that
mental states are qualitative ideas, or picture-like representations, But of course this is a
conception of mental states that is completely abhorrent to Frege, Frege grants the existence of
ideas in this sense-he calls them "Vorstellungen"-but he repeatedly denies that they are to
be identified with elements of thoughts, Frege's anti-psychologism is a precursor to externalist
conceptions of mental states. 16 On such approaches, two beliefs may differ, even though no
'
4 Peter Strawson, Individuals (London: Methuen, 1959), p, 20,
15See Strawson, Ibid., p. 22.
161 am not here asserting that Frege was everywhere consistent in his externalism. For
instance, in his unpublished 1906 "Introduction to Logic", he clearly endorses a picture of the
senses of proper names according to which they are "object independent", that is, a proper
name, such as "Odysseus", expresses the sense it does, irrespective of whether or not the name
has a referent, See his Posthumous Writings,, ed. by Hans Hermes, et al, tr, by P, Long and
R, White (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 185-96, at p. 191, This passage
poses a difficulty for extemalist interpretations of Fregean sense of the sort advocated here and
in Chapter I of Gareth Evans' Varieties of Reference (New York: Oxford University Press,
57
distinction could be drawn between the two with the use of purely qualitative, general
descriptions,
The massive reduplication argument for deference to the world assumes that linguistic
meaning must be given in terms of purely qualitative, general description, and concludes from
this that no notion which serves as the linguistic meaning of a non-descriptive expression can
also fix its reference, Since Frege wished sense to serve as linguistic meaning, it could thus
not also fix reference. However, there is good reason to believe that linguistic meaning cannot
be given in terms of purely qualitative, general description, For suppose there is a symmetrical
universe with a substance different from water, yet qualitatively indistinguishable. Suppose
further that the denizens of this universe call this substance "water", I think it is obvious in
this case that the linguistic meaning of our term "water" differs from the linguistic meaning of
their term "water"'
I do not think the above intuition is controversial, It is implied by the view that the
linguistic meaning of a natural kind term like "water" is its referent, which is a thesis held by
some, However, one does not need to embrace such a view in order to account for this
intuition, One can equally well account for the intuition without denying that "water" and
"H20" have different linguistic meanings,
There is no reason to think that if the linguistic meaning of "water" is not its referent, then
one must give up the thesis that, if it is used to refer to something other than water in some
other part of the universe, "water" there expresses a different sense, It is furthermore
uncontroversial that this is indeed Frege's view, That is, Frege ascribed to the thesis that the
Sense of an expression was not its referent as well as to the thesis that a difference in
reference entailed a difference in Sense. As Frege writes:
1982). Thanks to Richard Cartwright for discussion here,
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Sentences and parts of sentences with different meanings [Bedeutungen] also have
different senses, If in a sentence or part of a sentence one constituent is replaced by
another with a different meaning, the different sentence or part that results does not
have to have a different meaning from the original; on the other hand, it always has a
different sense.17
Thus, while Frege would obviously think that the term "water"' expresses a sense which is not
its referent, he also would hold that, if "water" is used to refer to a substance different from
water, it then expresses a different sense.
I do not mean to say here that massive reduplication, or "twin" cases, are philosophically
unimportant. But the project which they threaten is a quite specific one. As twin cases show,
two people could be in identical (intrinsic) brain states, but differing mental states, This poses
a problem for the project of accounting for mind/brain supervenience. 18 But this project would
be of no interest to Frege, Frege never discusses the topic of how thoughts could be
neurophysiologically implemented, and no feature of his philosophy would cause him to
consider mind/brain supervenience issues as providing any sort of constraint whatever on the
identity conditions of senses.
Massive redup!ication arguments thus do not pose a threat to Frege's Thesis, 19
Considerations of deference do not show that Frege's Thesis places too many psychological
constraints on the relation of reference, Arguments that it does are based upon flawed
17Gottlob Frege, "Notes for Ludwig Darmstaedter", in his Posthumous Writings, pp, 253-
257, at p. 255.
'
8 See Jerry Fodor, Psychosemantics (Cambridge: Bradford Books, 1987), Ch. 2, for a clear
discussion of the problems twin cases raise for this project,
19The expression "twin-earth case" is often used to apply both to symmetrical universes, as
well as "twin" different possible worlds, I have not here addressed the latter kind of twin earth
case. because I believe modal considerations raise special concerns not present in the non-
modal scenario described by Strawson. For a discussion of some of these problems, see my
"Rigidity and Content", forthcoming in R, Heck, ed,, Language. Logic. and Reality: Essays in
Honor of Michael Dummett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995),
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conceptions of linguistic meaning, or conceptions of mental states which issue from concerns
foreign to Frege. Thus, such considerations do not refute the first consequence of Frege's
Thesis.
Ill.
Yet the first consequence of Frege's Thesis is not the most controversial one. It is the
second consequence of Frege's Thesis that has often been taken to demonstrate conclusively
the implausibility of the identification, For instance, in Language and Reality, Devitt and
Sterelney claim that, while the purported counterexamples to other consequences of Frege's
Thesis are "serious but not catastrophic", those leveled against its second consequence are the
ones that truly demonstrate its falsity,20 In this section, I turn to a defense of this consequence,
The second role of the sense of a term is to state what its competent users know in virtue
of which they count as understanding it, Thus, since knowledge of sense, or meaning, explains
understanding, sense is the primary notion in the theory of understanding, Broadly speaking, a
theory of understanding must explain our remarkable linguistic acumen. More narrowly
conceived, the core set of phenomena for which a theory of understanding is accountable are
our intuitions about linguistic competence. Stated in the formal mode, a theory of
understanding, to achieve descriptive adequacy, must explain our intuitions about the truth-
conditions of instances of the schema rx understands the utterance ul, in various counterfactual
situations,
A theory of understanding is a theory of semantic competence. Like other linguistic
theories, then, it is necessary to abstract from performance errors. Thus, the counterfactual
20Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelney, Language and Reality (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987),
p. 46.
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situations in which we test theories of understanding should be those in which there is no
question of an error in performance. That is, in evaluating the data for such a theory, we must
abstract from situations in which failure to understand is due to poor acoustics, or other
contextual factors, such as the failure of context to disambiguate utterances, In what follows,
discussion of such cases should be presumed to be occurring in such idealized circumstances.
According to the second consequence of Frege's Thesis, full competence with a term
requires non-trivial, uniquely identifying information about its referent, I shall defend this
consequence by arguing that a theory of the second role of sense, that is, a theory of
understanding, must invoke a highly non-trivial, or "rich", notion of meaning. According to
Hilary Putnam, natural kind terms raise special problems for theories of understanding which
avail themselves of rich notions of meaning, of the sort required by Frege's Thesis. I shall
begin by discussing Putnam's worries, I shall then argue that a recognition of the context-
dependency of ascriptions of understanding provides a defense of rich notions of meaning
against Putnam's arguments.
In his paper, "The Meaning of 'Meaning"', Putnam raises a famous problem for a rich
notion of meaning. According to Putnam, a speaker, such as himself, who knows nothing that
distinguishes elms from beeches, nonetheless is linguistically competent with the terms, and
hence understands them. If so, then understanding a term does not require individuating
knowledge of its referent, contra the second consequence of Frege's Thesis.
If Putnam is correct in maintaining that he is competent with the terms "elm" and "beech"
despite his lack of individuating knowledge of elms and beeches, then the second consequence
of Frege's Thesis imposes too stringent conditions for competence with a term. The interest of
Putnam's case thus lies in the tension it reveals between the need for sense to play a central
role in a theory of linguistic competence, and the second consequence of Frege's Thesis, As
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we have seen, one result of the Thesis is that speakers who know the meaning of a term are
predicted to have uniquely identifying knowledge of its referent, Furthermore, such knowledge
is non-trivial; the fact that an account of the meaning of a term must also serve as an
explanation of how the term gets the reference it does bars knowledge of trivial descriptions,
such as "the reference of t", from conferring understanding of t to a speaker. 2 ' Yet surely there
is a sense of linguistic competence in which Putnam, despite his lack of individuating
knowledge about elms, nonetheless counts as a competent user of the term, Compare Putnam
with, for example, a monolingual speaker of Chinese, who cannot use the term "elm" at all, It
seems intuitive to say that Putnam has certain knowledge concerning the term "elm" that the
monolingual speaker of Chinese lacks, and it is in virtue of this knowledge that Putnam can
use the term to utter grammatical sentences of English, But if we identify this knowledge with
the meaning of the term "elm", then the resultant notion of meaning is far weaker than that
required by Frege's Thesis.
Frege's strategy results in a conception of meaning according to which it is not a simple
matter to attain knowledge of the meaning of a term, In order to count as knowing the
meaning of a term, a speaker must be in possession of non-trivial individuating knowledge
about its referent. Such a concept of meaning is thus similar in certain respects to a very
intuitive characterization of meaning as dictionary definition, But cases such as Putnam's
elm/beech example are intended to demonstrate that the "intuitive notion of meaning" is
actually less demanding than the notion defined by Frege's strategy.
Let us grant that Putnam is correct in thinking that there is some notion of linguistic
competence such that a speaker counts as knowing the meaning of a term in this sense without
having the sort of knowledge required in order to know the meaning in the sense imposed by
21This is, again, Condition (C) of NN.
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Frege's Thesis. According to Jaines Higginbotham, for instance, there are two different notions
of linguistic knowledge.22 The first, which he calls "knowledge of reference", is less
demanding than the second, which can, for our purposes, simply be called "knowledge of
meaning". One counts as knowing the reference of a term, (or, in the limit case, the truth
conditions of a sentence) simply in virtue of knowing its grammatical category and semantic
type.23 However, such knowledge is only necessary, and not sufficient, for full-fledged
knowledge of meaning. The latter requires, in addition, knowledge of something like the
dictionary definition of the lexical items.24 Given this distinction, the Fregean could maintain
that what lies behind elm/beech type cases is an equivocation between these two relatively
clear notions of linguistic competence.
The Fregean's task is of course not an easy one. The pressure Putnam's examples place on
the notion of meaning presupposed by Frege's strategy comes when one considers the meaning
of a sentence as the object of communication. If knowledge of meaning is non-trivial enough
to imply that speakers are often ignorant of meaning, and hence fail to understand the
utterances of others, then it is difficult to account for our remarkable communicative success.
A successful defense of the notion of meaning that results from Frege's Thesis must thus
exploit a concept such as that of a speaker's partial knowledge of meaning in an analysis of
the phenomenon of communication.
22See James Higginbotham, "Knowledge of Reference", in Alexander George, Reflections
on Chomsky (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp, 153-174,
23This is how I take Higginbotham's talk of"knowing the logical skeleton" of a sentence
(Ibid., p, 166),
241t is not clear that what Higginbotham calls "Elucidations of meaning" will result in
something so informative as a dictionary definition, but it seems that this is a natural
identification.
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This point has been clearly recognized by those who defend a Fregean picture of sense,
such as Dummett:
The notion of sense has to do with the speakers' understanding of their language, that
is, with their grasp of meaning, Since Frege wrote, we have become highly conscious
of a distinction he barely recognized, that between the meaning of an expression in the
common language and an individual speaker's grasp of its meaning. This distinction is
not forced on us merely by speakers' invariably imperfect knowledge of their
language-their partial understanding of some words and misunderstanding of others:
we need also to attend to the connections which a speaker makes between a name and
its bearer which he does not suppose to underlie its use in the language and which are
not of a kind to do so..,[I]t is evident that an adequate account of how language
functions cannot ignore the fact that speech is an activity of rational agents, whose
reasons for saying what they do rest upon their admittedly limited awareness of the
meanings of the words they use.25
Sense, conceived of as public linguistic meaning, still, on this picture, retains its primary role
as the ultimate "object" of communication, since meaning in a public language can be taken to
be conceptually prior to a speaker's partial knowledge of it.
Of course, the legitimacy of importing the notion of partial knowledge of meaning must be
defended on explanatory grounds. More specifically, it must be argued that a theory that
invokes a rich conception of meaning, together with partial knowledge, provides a better
explanation of the phenomena under consideration, than competing frameworks. Given what
we have said about the core data of a theory of understanding, we thus must demonstrate that
ordinary ascriptions of understanding are best explained by such a theory,
As we have seen, for Frege, understanding an expression amounts to knowing what its
sense is. Thus, understanding is a species of knowledge-what. But ascriptions of knowledge-
what are context-dependent. Whether or not an utterance of "John knows what horses are" is
true depends heavily on context. Suppose John was among people who could not distinguish
horses from dogs, but that John could distinguish horses from dogs, though not from, say,
25Michael Dummett, "The Relative Priority of Thought and Language", in his Frege and
Other Philosophers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 315-324, at pp. 321-322.
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donkeys. If someone then pointed to a dog, and called it a horse, it seems to me John could
legitimately respond by asserting that he knew what horses were, and that they were not dogs.
However, if John were among horse-experts, and ascribed horse-hood to a donkey, they could
truly assert that he did not know what horses are.
It is a difficult question exactly what kind of knowledge-ascription ascriptions of
understanding are. However, one feature they share with other ascriptions of knowledge-what
is their context-dependency. Consider, for example, Putnam in a normal conversational
situation, in which no botanists are present. If, in such a situation, a speaker utters the
sentence, "An elm is a nice tree", then it seems that we can attribute to Putnam an
understanding of the occurrence of the term "elm", despite his lack of knowledge of the full
meaning of "elm". However, suppose Putnam is in a situation in which expert botanists are
holding a technical discussion about subtle differences between elms and other sorts of trees,
In such a situation, Putnam could truly assert either that he does not know what elms are, or
he does not really understand utterances of the word "elm" on that occasion.
Thus, in a situation in which we are comparing Putnam to ordinary non-elm experts, we
might assert that he knows the meaning of "elm", Among botanists, however, the claim that he
knows the meaning of "elm" is more dubious. Thus, the truth of utterances of the form, rx
understands the expression el depends upon the context in which they are uttered, One natural
way of accounting for this phenomenon is via the notion of partial knowledge of meaning. On
the Fregean conception, the (full) meaning of a term consists of some set of conditions which,
taken together, apply uniquely to an object. The context-dependence of ascriptions of
knowledge of meaning can be taken as providing evidence that the truth-conditions of such
ascriptions invoke the concept of partial knowledge of meaning. That is, an instance of the
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schema, Fx understands the expression el is true just in case she knows those aspects of the
(full) meaning of the term that are relevant in the context in which that instance is uttered,26
I have argued that locutions of the form Fx understands the expression el are context-
dependent. The two "clear" notions of linguistic competence, Higginbotham's knowledge of
reference, and knowledge of (full) meaning, can then be taken as the limit cases of the context
dependency. Situations in which instances of the schema rx understands the expression el are
true despite a potential lack of individuating knowledge of the referent of e, are then accounted
for via the notion of partial knowledge of meaning.
Now, the (full) meaning of a term, on a theory of understanding that recognizes the
context-dependency of ascriptions of knowledge of meaning, will be perhaps richer than that
required by Frege's identification. One worry about such a notion of meaning is that it may
incorporate too much of what seems to be contingent information about the object into the
meaning of a term. There are two related points to make about this worry. First of all, a sharp
distinction between contingent information about an obJect and information about its meaning
is in any case suspect, The second point is that, just as fallibilism in epistemology asserts that
we can be certain about contingent propositions, so an epistemological view of meaning must
be content with metaphysically contingent truths in virtue of meaning,27
261 am not here suggesting that the context-dependency of expressions such as Fx
understands the expression <p, or rx knows the meaning of N1 , cannot be accounted for in a
theory that fails to invoke the concept of partial knowledge of meaning. One could, for
instance, argue that the full meaning of an expression is itself a context dependent matter. That
is, one could argue that the entire meaning of a term changes from context to context. One
could then identify what is common to all utterances of an expression e with the function from
contexts to full meanings. However, giving a coherent characterization of the function in
question is not a simple task,
27See my "Rigidity and Content" for discussion,
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In a paper solely devoted to the theory of understanding, I would dwell more upon the sort
of notion of meaning that I have argued such a theory must presuppose, Yet for our purposes,
further investigation into the details is not required, For what we have seen is that a plausible
theory of understanding can invoke a notion of meaning that, at the very least, determines
reference.28
28Thanks to Robert Stalnaker and Richard Cartwright for discussion and criticism.
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Rigidity and Content
If d designates the object o, then, if we abstract from worlds in which o does not exist, d
is a rigid designator just in case d has the same extension in all possible worlds.' Rigid
designation concerns the behavior of certain tennrms when evaluated with respect to
counterfactual situations. Hence, one might think that the distinction between rigid and non-
rigid expressions is one which is relevant only when the modal status of an utterance is in
question. Yet many philosophers hold that this distinction is, demonstrably, one which has
relevance for what is expressed by, or the truth-conditions of, utterances of ordinary
unmodalized sentences.
In many of his writings, Michael Dummett has voiced objections to this view. However,
his points have generally been misunderstood or ignored. Philosophers have continued to
assume that rigidity has been shown, in Kripke's words, to affect "the truth conditions.,.of (the
propositions expressed by) all sentences, including simple sentences".2 In this paper, I will
attempt to uncover the possible arguments for this view. With Dummett, I shall argue that the
thesis that rigidity affects the content of simple sentences should be viewed with more
suspicion than recent philosophy of language suggests,
To set up the issue, we must first provide a characterization of what is asserted by an
utterance of an ordinary unmodalized sentence. This I attempt in Section 1. In Section II, I
consider and reject several semantical arguments for the thesis that rigidity is somehow
I am using the definition of rigidity given in a letter from Kripke to Kaplan, cited on
p. 569 of Kaplan's "Afterthoughts" (pp, 565-614 of Themes from Kaplan [Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1989]). Other forms of rigidity, such as temporal rigidity, are not at issue in
this paper.
2Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 12.
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relevant for individuating what is asserted by utterances of unmodalized sentences, In Section
III, I argue that this thesis depends upon an unsppported conception of the relation between
assertoric content and metaphysical possibility,
Section I,
The focus of this paper is the thesis that rigidity affects the content of simple sentences,
This thesis is a significant philosophical claim. It is significant because it sets significant
constraints on the identity conditions of the objects of assertion, It is philosophical because an
explication of the notion of the content of assertion is a central task of philosophy, By setting
constraints on the identity conditions of the objects of assertion, the thesis constrains the class
of possible explications of this notion. The goal of this paper is to evaluate whether it
correctly constrains this class,
There are two general models of philosophical explication, The first is rational
reconstruction. When one rationally reconstructs a concept, one does not concern oneself with
faithfulness to some pre-theoretic notion, Only those features of the intuitive notion that can,
in Carnap's words, be "rationally justified" are to be features of the reconstructed concept, A
rational reconstruction is judged by how fruitful the reconstructed concept turns out to be. The
second model of philosophical explication is a description of some intuitive, pre-theoretic
notion. This should be judged on how much it matches our pre-theoretic intuitions about the
concept, Every actual philosophical explication is a confusing mixture of both models.
The project of giving a philosophical explication of the objects of assertion is no different
in this respect from other philosophical explications. Simply describing ordinary usage of
locutions such as "what John said" will certainly not lead to any sort of theoretically fruitful
concept. However, completely abandoning any pre-theoretic notion of content may leave us
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with nothing about which to theorize fruitfully,? In this section, I will attempt to flesh out this
project more fully, with the goal of showing why the thesis that rigidity affects the content of
assertions of simple sentences should not be blindly accepted.
Asserting that p is an act, As Richard Cartwright writes, "We sometimes contrast saying
(asserting, stating) with doing; but in a wider sense to say something is to do something", 4 As
with any act, we must distinguish the act type from the act token. The act type is asserting that
p., A token of this type occurs when, on a particular occasion, someone asserts that p. But
aside from the act type, asserting that p, and a given tokening of that type, we must also
recognize the content of the assertion, The content of an assertion is not an act; it is not
"done". It is, as Cartwright writes, "not the sort of thing that can be done",5
At least one of the things which one accomplishes with the act of assertion is to
distinguish possibilities, By asserting that p, I am distinguishing the possible circumstances in
which it is true that p, from those in which it is not true that p, There are two points to make
about this observation, First of all, for many substitutions of different sentences for "p" and
"q", asserting that p is a different action from asserting that q, Now, kicking Paul is a different
action from kicking Clem, if Paul is not Clem, Analogously, we account for intuitive
distinctions between asserting that p and asserting that q by allowing the possible
circumstances to differ in the two cases,
3For instance, it has been argued that our ordinary intuition that "Hesperus is Phosphorus"
and "Hesperus is Hesperus" say different things cannot be preserved on a systematic,
reconstructed notion of meaning. But if it could be shown that our ordinary intuition that "Bill
Clinton is President" and "2 + 2 =4" say diifferent things also cannot be preserved, we would
view the result as casting doubt on the very project of systematically charactzrizing a notion of
content,
4Richard Cartwright, "Propositions", in his Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1987), pp. 33-53, at p. 35.
5Ibid., p. 36.
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The second point is that the sense of possibility here is completely neutral, It is the sense
of possibility invoked when one, in the course of a proof in mathematics, asserts that there are
three distinct possibilities.6 On a straightforward account of mathematical assertion, one cannot
take the possibility in question to be metaphysical. What is prima facie metaphysically
impossible could very well, from the perspective of this notion, count as possible. Since to
assert that 2 + 2 = 4 is clearly to do something different from asserting that Peano Arithmetic
is incomplete, in this neutral sense of possibility, they are true in different circumstances.
The unexplanatory nature of the sense of possibility in question provokes two opposing
reactions, First of all, one could, with Robert Stalnaker, attempt to reduce this notion of
possibility to metaphysical possibility,7 On this account, the content of an assertion that p and
an assertion that q are the same just in case they distinguish different metaphysical
possibilities. One must, however, reanalyze the content of apparent metaphysical
impossibilities to make them come out metaphysically possible after all, The second route one
could take is to deny that talk of possibility in this context is to be taken as explanatory at all,
For if we tried to explain the difference in assertoric content between an utterance of "2 + 2 =
4" and "PA is incomplete" by invoking different possible circumstance in which they are true,
there may be no other way to describe the different circumstances except by appealing to the
difference in assertoric content to be explained. If this is correct, then one does not need to
invoke metaphysical possibility at all in distinguishing the contents of assertions: some other
account does the required work,8
61 owe this example to Richard Heck, who used it in a lengthy e-mail debate between
Block, Heck, Stalnaker, and myself,
7See Robert Stalnaker, Inquity (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987).
For instance, one could account for a difference in the content of two assertions by
adverting to differing "Russellian propositions".
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How does one assert that p? The typical method is to utter some sentence, Sentences are
sequences of word-types, Utterances are tokens of these sequences produced by utterers, 9 Now,
one may utter some sentence, but fail to assert anything at all, For present purposes, we shall
abstract away from this possibility, and assume that any utterance of a sentence on an occasion
in fact asserts something. Furthermore, in what follows, we consider only utterances of
"simple" sentences, that is, sentences not containing any modal vocabulary,' 0
With these distinctions in place, we may now broach the issue of rigidity, I shall take
rigidity to be a property of (non-sentential) word-types," The thesis under consideration is as
follows, If one utters a sentence containing a rigid term, then one has asserted something
different from what one would have asserted had one uttered, on that very same occasion, any
sentence differing from the original one only in the substitution of a non-rigid term for the
rigid one. 12 Loosely following Dummett's terminological practice, let us say that the content of
an assertion which is made by uttering a sentence S is the assertoric content of that utterance
of S,13 Then the thesis under consideration is that if S and S' are two sentence which differ
91 am thus using "utterance" as synonymous with sentence-token rather than to refer to the
act of uttering a sentence-token, I will occasionally also use it in this latter sense, leaving it to
context to disambiguate.
'
0 We also abstract away from sentences containing propositional attitude verbs,
"Strictly speaking, this characterization is inappropriate. For, as Charles Parsons has
pointed out to me, there are (albeit rather concocted) examples of terms such that whether or
not they are rigid depends upon context. Consider, for example, the description "the x such
that x = me if I am Jason Stanley, or x = the present Prime Minister of Norway if not".
120ne must be careful to distinguish this from the trivially true thesis that what one would
have done would have been different. Of course, there is a sense in which what one would
have done would have different, for one would be uttering different words,
9
"Loosely", because Dummett typically takes assertoric content to attach to sentences.
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only in that one contains a rigid term where the other contains a non-rigid term, then no two
utterances of S and S' can have the same assertoric content.
It will be useful to have a notion of content for sub-sentential expressions. Since assertoric
content is fundamentally a property of utterances in contexts, the content of a sub-sentential
expression will also be taken relative to a context. We restrict our attention to terms, for
simplicity's sake. Consider two terms (word-types), t and t'. We shall say that t has the same
content, with respect to a context c, as t', just in case, for any sentence S which contains t as a
constituent, an utterance u of S in c would have the same assertoric content as an utterance of
a sentence which results from S by replacing t' for t. Then the thesis can be stated as: no rigid
term ever has the same content as a non-rigid term, Let us call this thesis RT,
If RT is not to be trivially false, we must make a further distinction, For sentences could,
in a quite intuitive sense, say the same thing in one context, though not in many others.
Consider, for example, a context in which it is obvious to all participants that John is a man,
In such a context, there may be no felt difference between asserting that John is a bachelor,
and asserting that John is unmarried, However, in other contexts, in which John's sex is
unknown, there would clearly be such a difference, Similarly, in a context in which it is
obvious that John is the tallest man in the room, there may be no felt difference between
asserting that John likes Mary, and asserting that the tallest man in the room likes Mary. Thus,
we must come up with some notion of the content of an assertion, according to which such
contexts do not count as refutations of RT,
Though this task requires several idealizations, I think it nonetheless can be accomplished,
For even in contexts in which it is known that John is the tallest man in the room, there is a
sense of content in which asserting that the tallest man in the room likes Mary and asserting
that John likes Mary have different contents. Let us distinguish what is communicated by an
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utterance of a sentence from what the utterance of that sentence expressed on that occasion.
We shall take both what is communicated as well as what is expressed by the utterance to be
objects of the same-kind -- in vague parlance, "truth-conditions", or "propositions",
The notion of what an utterance of a sentence expresses and what an utterance of a
sentence communicates are related by the following principle, which we may call the
Expression-Communication Principle, or ECP.
If an utterance u of a sentence S expresses something different from an utterance u' of
another sentence S', then, ceteris paribus, for any normal context c, had S and S' been
uttered in c, they would have communicated different things,t 4
We shall take assertoric content as explicating the notion of what an utterance expresses. ECP
reflects the obvious truth that differences in what is expressed should be reflected in
differences in use. It is also worth emphasizing that the legitimacy of the Gricean attempt to
reduce applied timeless meaning to utterer's-occasion meaning depends crucially on the truth
of ECP, If ECP is false, then no reduction of literal meaning to intended meaning is possible.
However, even one who lacks such reductive aspirations should nonetheless accept ECP, since
even if literal meaning is not reducible to intended meaning, there surely must exist
supervenience relations between the two,
Suppose RT is true, Then, if t is rigid, and t' is non-rigid, for any two sentences S and S'
which differ only in that t occurs in the former where t' occurs in the latter, any utterance of S
'
4By a normal context I mean one in which the speakers are competent with all of the
words in the sentences being uttered, and the sentence is used as it standardly is. The notion of
a sentence being standardly used perhaps is characterizable with the use of something
analogous to Grice's "central range of speech acts" -- see his "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-
Meaning, and Word-Meaning", pp, 117-137 of his Study in the Way of Words [Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1989]. By "competent speaker" I mean someone who is considered
authoritative with respect to that term in that community. Contexts thus count as normal
relative to the sentences being uttered. From now on, I shall use "context" to mean "normal
context".
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expresses something different from an utterance of S'. RT is worrisome for the following two
reasons.
The first reason why RT is worrisome is that there seem to be obvious counter-examples.
Consider, for example, the two terms "the president", and "the actual president". Suppose Bill
Clinton drops by for a surprise visit, I could convey this by uttering either:
(1) The Presisdent of the United States came by for a visit
or:
(2) The actual President of the United States came by for a visit
The difference between (1) and (2) does not seem to me to be a difference in assertoric
content. For the difference between utterances of (I) and (2) is not reflected in truth-
conditions. It is rather one of "coloring", or "tone", like the difference between typical
unphilosophical usages of "truth" and "absolute truth". I would use "the actual President",
rather than just "the President", not to distinguish different possibilities, but rather for
emphasis, to convey my surprise,15 Nonetheless, one term is rigid, while the other is not, so,
according to RT, sentences containing them must say different things.',
"
5Though let me emphasize that such intuitions of what is and is not truth-conditional are,
of course, just as defeasible as similar intuitions about what is asserted, For they depend upon
a certain conception of what truth-conditions are, which may turn out to be theoretically less
motivated than another. However, I believe that no notion of truth-condition can incorporate
everything which Frege called the associations of an expression, and the difference between
(1) and (2) is only accountable in terms of this latter category (see p. 139 ff, of his "Logic"
(pp. 126-151 of Posthumous Writings [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979]).
1'The defender of RT might respond here by maintaining that (1) and (2) conventionally
implicate different things, and therefore express different things. For (2) might be said to
conventionally implicate that the utterer is surprised at the fact that the president came for a
visit, whereas (1) carries no such implication. However, as Grice has often maintained, two
utterances may conventionally implicate different things, yet say the same thing (c.f. Paul
Grice, "Logic and Conversation", in his Studies in the Ways of Words (Cambridge MA:
Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 22-40, at pp. 25ff.), I believe the difference between
utterances of (l) and (2) falls in this category. Even if the conventional implicature exists, it is
not of the sort which affects assertoric content, since (2) would be true even if the utterer
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The second reason why RT is worrisome is slightly more theoretical, As we have seen, the
background knowledge of the participants in a context affects what is communicated by an
utterance of a sentence. By invoking the distinction between what is expressed and what is
communicated, these effects may be mitigated somewhat, Yet surely, what is expressed is
linked to what is communicated at least via ECP, But even where S and S' are simple
sentences, RT implies that speakers typically communicate different things by uttering them.
But initially, there is no reason to believe that the distinction between rigidity and non-rigidity,
by itself, provides for the existence of such a difference.
To take an example from Dummett, consider the name "St. Anne". Now, it is plausible
that any speaker competent with this term knows that it refers to the mother of the Virgin
Mary. However, "St., Anne" is rigid, whereas "the mother of the Virgin Mary" is not,' 7 But it
is by no means clear that utterances of two sentences, differing only in that one of these terms
is replaced by the other, can typically communicate different things. However, RT implies just
this,
More generally, suppose that there is some non-rigid definite description DD such that
anyone who uses the name N on a regular basis knows that it denotes the bearer of that name.
Then, despite the fact that the name is rigid while the description is not, competent speakers
typically would communicate the same thing by an utterance of a sentence containing the
name as they would by uttering the sentence with the description replaced by the name. The
fact that most proper names do not have the same content as any non-rigid expression seems
not so much due to a modal distinction as to the fact that there is usually no one definite
expected the visit.
7In every world in which the Virgin Mary exists, "the mother of the Virgin Mary"
denotes St. Anne. However, there are worlds in which St. Anne exists, but "the mother of the
Virgin Mary" does not refer,
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description which all speakers who use a name on a regular basis know applies to its referent,
But surely, this is a contingent fact.
There are two responses the defender of RT could give in reply to these worries. The first
would be to bite the bullet, and maintain that despite intuitions to the contrary, rigidity and
non-rigidity, by themselves, make a difference to what is communicated. The second response
would be to claim that the occurrence of a rigid term in an utterance of one sentence, and a
non-rigid term in an utterance of another, is sufficient to conclude that the assertoric contents
are different, even if utterances of the sentences typically communicate the same things. This
second response thus involves the denial of ECP. Both of these responses require motivation,
The first requires an argument that the distinction between rigid and non-rigid expressions
does, after all, always affect what is communicated. The second requires an argument that a
notion for which ECP does not hold is a notion of content at all,
I shall not treat the first of these responses in this paper, It is certainly possible to
introduce, as does Gareth Evans, a rigid designator whose reference is fixed by a single non-
rigid description, and which is such that anyone who is competent with the term knows the
reference-fixing stipulation," In such a case, simple sentences containing them will typically
communicate the same thing.
Instead, I shall consider, in the rest of the paper, the second of these responses, that is,
arguments which imply that utterances of two sentences could have different assertoric
contents, even if utterances of them typically would communicate the same thing, One such
argument might come from considerations of the semantics of natural language. For rigid
terms and non-rigid terms are assigned different semantic values in a compositional semantic
18See Evans' discussion of the name "Julius", introduced into the language to (rigidly)
denote the inventor of the zip, in his "Reference and Contingency", in his Collected Papers
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), pp, 178-213,
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theory for languages containing modal expressions. It might be thought that this difference in
semantic value implies a difference in content, even if no difference in what is communicated
exists, In the next section, vwe turn to an examination of this argument.
Section II.
In this section, I shall discuss how considerations from the formal semantics of natural
language bear upon the evaluation of RT. I shall begin by introducing a thesis about content
which implies RT, and underlies its acceptance, This thesis, as we shall see, follows from a
trivial modal semantical fact, if there exist entailment relations between the notion of content
discussed in the previous section, and modal semantic value, We then consider two theses
which, if true, would establish the required entailment relations. The first of these proceeds
from general considerations about semantic value, and its relation to content,19 The second
identifies content with modal semantic value. Both of these theses, I shall argue, are false,
in Lecture I of Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke considers two possible versions of a
"cluster of descriptions" theory of names. The sole difference between these two theories lies
in the fact that one theory, but not the other, accepts the following thesis
(*) The statement, 'If X exists, then X has most of the (p's' expresses a necessary
truth.20
According to Kripke, the distinction between these two theories can be characterized as follow.
On the theory which embraces Thesis (*), the cluster of descriptions gives the meaning of the
'
9A terminological note: the expression "semantic value"' is to be interpreted relative to a
semantic theory. By the semantic value of an expression relative to a semantic theory T, I
mean whatever entity T assigns to that expression via either its axioms or its theorems,
20Naming and Necessity, p. 65.
79
name, whereas someone who rejects Thesis (*) "doesn't think that the cluster is part of the
meaning of the name".21
Instead of "cluster-theories", let us suppose that these theories are "one-description"
theories. The two theories then differ in that one accepts, while the other rejects:
(*') The statement, 'If X exists, then X is the 9' expresses a necessary truth,
Such "one-description" theories are certainly false, and no contemporary philosopher holds
such a view. But using this theory will simplify our exposition considerably, without
prejudicing the discussion.
Thus, we have two theories of proper names, which differ only in that one embraces, and
the other rejects, Thesis (*'), As we have seen, according to Kripke, the way to describe the
difference between these theories is that according to the one that accepts Thesis (*'), the
description gives the meaning of the proper name, whereas according to the theory that rejects
Thesis (*'), it does not. Considering only possibilities in which p( refers, it thus is the case, on
Kripke's view, that
If an expression (p has the same meaning as an expression y9, then the sentence
r(p is il must express a necessary truth.
Let us call this the Meaning Assumption, or MA.
What is relevant for our purposes is that a jrinciple very similar to MA implies RT, This
principle I shall call the content assumption, or CA. It is as follows:
If an expression p( has the same content as an expression y in a context c, then an
utterance in c of the sentence r•p is ryl must express a necessary truth,
If CA is true, then RT is true. For let e be some rigid expression, and e' some non-rigid
expression. Then utterances of re is e'1 are not necessary, and hence, by CA, e and e' do not
have the same content relative to any context. Whether or not Kripke has, by his acceptance of
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21Ibid.
MA, endorsed CA, depends upon what Kripke intended to express by his use of the term
"meaning".
A central concern of Kripke's was with expressions which had hitherto resisted treatment
from the perspective of formal semantics. In particular, Kripke's semantics revolutionized the
study of quantified modal logic. Kripke semantics revealed the semantic import of sentences of
languages which combined modal operators with quantifiers. This showed why sentences such
as the Barcan Formula and its converse, made controversial metaphysical claims. Finally,
Kripke showed how to develop axiom systems which had the appropriate metaphysical
neutrality.22
The axiom system developed by Kripke in "Semantical Considerations" lacked designators
-- it contained neither constants nor free-variables. 23 But axiom systems which lack constants
seem inappropriate as representations of ordinary modal discourse. However, it was well-
known that adding non-rigid designators led to rather drastic failures of traditional logical
laws. If proper names could be shown to rigid, then the task of representing modal discourse
with the use of quantified modal logic would become that much easier.24
It is thus tempting to take his use of an expression such as "meaning" as semantic value in
a standard modal semantics, This interpretation of Kripke's talk of meaning would also justify
22Saul Kripke, "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic", Acta Philosophical Fennica
16 (1963).
23Free variables were given the closure interpretation, to block the derivation of the
Converse Barcan Formula.
24It is often assumed that the failures of substitution are due to the nature of the terms in
the language. However, Robert Stalnaker has persuasively argued that they are due instead to a
failure to recognize the difference between an arbitrary formula and a predication, Though
present conceptually in the extensional first-order theory, the difference becomes important
when one adds intensional operators, If one follows Stalnaker, then there will be no violations
of substitution, even if the language contains non-rigid terms. See his "Complex Predicates"
and "The Interaction of Quantification with Identity and Modality", forthcoming.
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Kripke's belief in the obviousness of MA. For if this is what Kripke had intended by his use of
"meaning", then MA would be a trivial consequence of the standard definition of identity,
Let "Val" express the denotation function from expressions of the object-language and
possible worlds to the extensions of those expressions in those worlds. In other words,
fVal(e,w)1 denotes the extension of e taken with respect to w. If e is a singular term, then
rVal(e,w)l denotes an individual; if e is a predicate-expression, then rVal(e,w)l denotes a set
of ilidividuals; and if e is a sentence, then FVal(e,w)l denotes a truth-value. Furthermore,
assume the following as semantical axioms governing the object-language expressions, "n"
and ,,=,,:25
(a) rE pl is true iff Vw (Val(p,w) = t)
(b) Val( re = e'1, w) = t iff Val(e,w) = Val(e',w)
If "meaning" in the statement of MA means semantic value in a standard modal semantics,
then we may state it as follows:
(MA*) Vw (Val(e,w) = Val(e',w)) iff rie = e'1 is true
MA* follows trivially from these standard axioms.
However, Kripke's talk of meaning almost certainly invokes a pre-theoretic concept. Thus,
we should resist the temptation to identify his use of the term with semantic value in a modal
semantics. One might, however, think that the triviality of MA* implies the triviality of CA.
That is, one might think that CA is itself a direct consequence of the definition of identity in a
traditional modal semantics. But this view is mistaken. For MA*, on our interpretation of it,
employs the notion of semantic value, which is explicated in terms of functions from possible
worlds into extensions. CA, on the other hand, alludes to the intuitive notion of content. One
2Warning: I am also using "=" as the sign for the identity relation in the metalanguage.
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can move from MA* to CA only if there exist entailment relations Udtween the possible
worlds notion of semantic value, and the notion of content discussed in Section 1,
It might be thought that the required entailment relations which allow one to move from
MA* to CA stem, not from the particular notion of semantic value employed by modal
semantic theories, but rather from a more general thesis about the relation of content to
semantic value. In particular, one might hold the following thesis, which we shall call the
Semantic Value Principle, or SVP:
Sameness of content (relative to a context c) implies sameness of semantic value in
any interesting, true semantic theory
Once the theoretical fruitfulness of modal semantics is accepted, SVP allows one to move
from MA* to CA. For if two terms have the same content relative to some context, then the
two terms must receive the same semantic value, and in particular, the same modal semantic
value,
However, SVP is false. Consider, for example, Kaplan's theory of indexicals,26 According
to Kaplan, utterances by me of "1 study philosophy" and "Jason Stanley studies philosophy"
express the same thing. Thus, relative to certain contexts, "I" and "Jason Stanley" have the
same content, But these two expressions receive different semantic values according to the
semantic theory -- they have different "characters". These differences in character do not show
that the two expressions cannot, relative to some contexts, have the same content.
A denial of RT commits one to the thesis that, relative to some contexts, a rigid designator
can have the same content as a non-rigid designator. Thus, a denial of RT commits one to the
thesis that the distinction between rigidity and non-rigidity does not always affect content. Just
as the semantic differences between "1" and "Jason Stanley" do niot imply that in contexts in
26See David Kaplan, "Demonstratives", in J. Almog, et al., eds., Themes From Kaplan
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 481-563.
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which I use the expressions, they do not have the same content, so, modulo the truth of CA,
the semantic differences between a rigid designator and a non-rigid designator do not imply a
difference in content relative to simple sentences.
It is also worthwhile pointing out that even a "weakened" version of SVP, which states
that if two sentences always have the same assertoric content, then they must have the same
semantic values, is false. Consider the following counter-example, Sentences containing the
terms "every" and "a" behave differently with respect to context. In particular, "a" seems to
license discourse anaphora, whereas "every" does not. This is shown by the contrast between
the following two discourses;
(3) A man is walking in the park, He is whistling
(4) * Every man is walking in the park, He is whistling
This contrast can be captured elegantly in Dynamic Logic, the semantic theory advanced by
Groenendijk and Stokhof.2 7 In this theory, the differences between "every" and "a" are
explained in terms of a difference in the type of semantic value they receive.
The details of Dynamic Semantics need not concern us here, The important point for our
purposes is that the theory predicts that "3x(px" does not receive the same semantic value as
"-Vx-'px". However, this does not entail, and nor do Groenendijk and Stokhof believe it
entails, that (5) and (6) do not have the same truth-conditions, or somehow assert different
things;
(5) A man is walking in the park.
(6) Not every man is not walking in park.
27See their "Dynamic Predicate Logic", Linguistics and Philosophy 14 (Kluwer Academic
Publishing, 1991), pp. 39-100, and "Dynamic Montague Grammar", Papers from the Second
Symposium on Logic and Language, ed, by Kalman and Polos (Budepest: Akademiai Kiado,
1990), pp. 3-48.
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Thus, in dynamic logic, the difference in semantic value between (5) and (6), though
accounting for the interesting fact that one can follow (5) but not (6), with "He is whistling",
does not entail a difference in assertoric content. The fact that (5) and (6), according to
Dynamic Logic, have different semantic values, does not entail that they have different
assertoric contents, 28
The explanation for the failure of weakened SVP is that semantic values are assigned in
order to explain how an expression embeds in more complex constructions, However, two
sentences could embed differently, yet nonetheless "say the same thing", As Dummett writes;
Someone who is able, for a given sentence, to classify specifications of possible states
of affairs into those that are adequate for an assertion made by uttering it, as a
complete sentence, on any given occasion, and then to classify the adequate ones into
those that render it correct and those that render it incorrect, may be said to know the
assertoric content of the sentence, It does not at all follow that he knows enough to
determine its contribution to the assertoric content of complex sentences of which it is
a subsentence. What one has to know to know that may be called its ingredient sense;
and that may involve much more than its assertoric content, Ingredient sense is what
semantic theories are concerned to explain, 29
Semantic value is intended as an explication of what Dummett calls ingredient sense, rather
than assertoric content.
Thus, SVP is false. Two expressions may have the same content, relative to some contexts,
despite the existence of significant semantic differences between them, Hence, there must be
something special about modal semantic value, such that any difference in it implies a
280One particularly clear example of the failure of weakened SVP, due to Michael
Dummett, is the difference between A and TA on a three-valued semantics. Utterances of
these two sentences say the same thing, Yet they embed differently under negation. If A is
truth-valueless, then so is 'A. But in this case, '-TA is true, See his The Logical Basis of
Metaphysics (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 48. There are many other
examples of failures of weakened SVP.
29Ibid,
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difference in content, One particularly clear way of establishing this connection is via the
following thesis;
The content of an occurrence of an expression is its semantic value according to a
standard possible-worlds semantics,
Let us call this thesis, the modal account of content, or MAC for short, According to MAC,
what is asserted by a sentence is the set of metaphysically accessible worlds in which that
sentence is true, and the content of a complex expression is derived from the content of its
parts, in a manner reflected by an appropriate semantical derivation,
MAC, together with MA*, entails CA, For assume MAC is correct, and consider uses of
two expressions e and e'. If they are assigned the same content, then, by MAC, they express
the same function from metaphysically possible worlds to truth-values. Thus, by MA*, an
utterance of rEI e = e'1 is true, But, by MAC, the semantic value of the utterance Fe = e'1 is
the set of metaphysically possible worlds in which the sentence is true, Hence, the sentence re
= e'1 expresses something necessary,
However, MAC is obviously false, No one believes that the assertoric content of an
utterance of "2 + 2 = 4" is the same as the assertoric content of an utterance of "Peano
Arithmetic is incomplete", The only view known to me which might be thought to support
MAC is that of Robert Stalnaker, After all, Stalnaker takes what is expressed by a sentence to
be a set of possible worlds. However, upon closer inspection, it can be seen that Stalnaker's
theory does not actually embrace MAC, For Stalnaker believes that "both demonstrative
expressions and proper names are rigid designators --terms that refer to the same individual in
all possible worlds". 30 If Stalnaker embraced MAC, then he would first of all hold that two
30Robert Stalnaker, "Assertion", in Davis, ed., Pragmatics (Oxford: Oxford Uniersity
Press, 1991), pp. 278-289, at p. 285.
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co-referring rigid designators, such as "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus", have the same meaning.
Thus, he would hold that:
(7) O Hesperus is Phosphorus
is true, Yet Stalnaker believes that utterances of:
(8) Hesperus is Phosphorus
are often contingent; they express Stalnaker's "diagonal proposition".31 Thus, what is expressed
by an utterance of (8) is not always --and in fact is rarely-- what it is predicted to be on a
traditional modal semantics. Indeed, on Stalnaker's theory, MAC fails rather badly.
Does Stalnaker accept CA, despite his clear rejection of MAC? This is a difficult question.
To answer it, we must distinguish between two possible interpretations of CA: a stronger, and
a weaker one, According to the stronger interpretation of CA, if two expressions e and e' have
the same content, then what is ordinarily expressed or asserted by the sentence Fe = e'l is
necessary. According to the weaker interpretation of CA, if two expressions e and e' have the
same content, then the sentence rFE e = e'1 is true,
I think it is plausible that insofar as Stalnaker would apply the term "content" to rigid
designators at all, he would say that the content of a proper name is its bearer, But a typical
utterance of, for example, (8), is contingent, Thus, only the second of these interpretations of
CA is consistent with Stalnake;'s views, On this second interpretation, an ordinary utterance of
(8) can be contingent. Nonetheless, an utterance of (7) is true. Thus, the weaker reading of CA
allows a theory such as Stalnaker's, where one utterance of a sentence can be necessary (say,
when embedded under modal operators), but another utterance of the very same sentence
contingent. Though Stalnaker does not --and cannot-- hold the stronger version of CA, he may
very well hold the weaker one.
3See his "Assertion" for details,
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It is worth pausing to comment on Stalnaker's seemingly paradoxical view that, though an
utterance of (8) is often contingent, (7) is nonetheless true. Surely the most natural reading of
a sentence such as (7) is that it attributes necessity to ordinary utterances of (8). What is going
on? Ironically, I believe that what is really behind his theory is a denial of at least the spirit of
CA. What underlies endorsing the contingency of an utterance of (8), and the truth of (7),
seems to be the recognition that in certain cases the metaphysical status of an utterance is
irrelevant to its assertoric content. Stalnaker's treatment of (8) reveals a sensitivity to the deep
connection between the notion of assertoric content, on the one hand, and informativity, on the
other.32 But by accounting for this informativity in terms of metaphysical contingency, he
seems to be conflating the very distinctions which Kripke correctly drew,33
Be that as it may, though Stalnaker at least believes that a traditional modal semantics
provides the right kind 3f meaning for an utterance --a set of possible worlds-- he still does
not think that the semantic value of an utterance of any sentence is simply the set of
metaphysically accessible worlds in which it is true. But most other philosophers reject MAC
on different grounds. According to a typical view, for example, the correct semantic theory is
one that assigns to utterances not sets of possible worlds, but rather structured propositions of
one form or another. Thus, this view rejects MAC because traditional modal semantics does
not provide the correct semantical paradigm for utterances. Nonetheless, on this view, CA is
true.
If CA could be shown to be true, then ECP would be false, Thus, it is crucial to see
whether or not an argument for CA can be provided. In the next section, we turn to more
32See, e.g., "Assertion", p. 284, principle 1.
3 3Of course, he is knowingly conflating these distinctions, in order to solve the problem of
intentionality,
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general considerations about the relation between assertoric content and modal status which
could provide a basis for CA,
Section III.
In this section, 1 first consider an argument along different lines, attributable to Kripke,
that CA follows from "ordinary language" considerations. I shall conclude that this argument is
flawed and, more generally, that arguments for CA depend upon questionable assumptions
about the relation between assertoric content and metaphysical possibility. Finally, I shall end
with a positive suggestion about the proper place of the distinction between rigid and non-rigid
expressions,
The following argument for CA can be culled from the preface to Naming and Necessity.
If it is sound, the argument demonstrates the truth of CA by showing that if sentence of the
form Ft is t'1 is not necessary, then t and t' must have different contents, Let t and t' be terms
which differ in that in some metaphysically possible world w, Val(t,w) - Val(t',w). Now
consider the following two simple sentences:
(9) t is t
(10) t is t'
Surely, what an utterance of (9) says is (metaphysically) necessary, But, given our
assumptions, what an utterance of (10) says is not necessary. But then, by Leibniz's Law, what
an utterance of (9) says awP, what an utterance of (10) says cannot be the same thing, Hence,
the assertoric content of (9) is different from the assertoric content of (10). But (9) and (10)
are simple sentences. Hence, t and t', by the definition of content in Section 1, have different
contents.
To evaluate this argument, consider a variation of it. Take the following two sentences:
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(11) Mary is a motorcycle mechanic, but she is interested in anti-realism
(12) Mary is a motorcycle mechanic, and she is interested in anti-realism
Suppose John utters (11), and Bill utters (12), Now, what John said presupposed that
motorcycle mechanics generally are not interested in anti-realism, but what Bill said did not
presuppose this, Since John uttered (11) and Bill uttered (12), we thus may conclude, by
Leibniz's Law, that what an utterance of (11) says and what an utterance of (12) says cannot
be the same thing. Hence, the assertoric content of an utterance of (11) is different from the
assertoric content of an utterance of (12).
However, for those who accept talk of presupposition, utterances of (11) do have the same
assertoric content, or truth-conditions, as utterances of (12), The fact that different utterances
give rise to different presuppositions does not imply a difference in truth-conditions. A
presupposition theorist would not (and should not) be swayed in her conviction by the fact that
English speakers regularly use such locutions as "what John said presupposes". Clearly, only a
theoretical argument to the effect that no principled distinction between what is presupposed
and what is asserted can be drawn would threaten the presupposition theorist's position,
More generally, once one begins to take ordinary uses of "what is said" at face value, no
two distinct terms will have the same content, For instance, suppose John utters;
(13) Bachelors are unmarried men
Suppose that Bill does not know the meaning of the word "bachelor". A perfectly ordinary
way of describing what occurred would be to say that what John said was news to Bill. Yet of
course what (14) says would not be news to Bill:
(14) Bachelors are bachelors
Thus, since what (13) says is news to Bill, and since what (14) says is not news to Bill, we
may conclude, by Leibniz's Law, that what (13) says and what (14) says are different; that is,
90
that they have different assertoric contents, 34 Since (14) results from (13) by substituting the
term "bachelors" for "unmarried men", the two terms hence have different contents.
Obviously, something is wrong with this sort of argument. The illegitimate step is the last
one, Bill is not a competent user of the word "bachelor". Hence, whether an utterance
containing that word is news to Bill or not has nothing to do with its assertoric content,
Similarly, Kripke's argument is something of a non sequitur, What needs to be established is
that the modal status of an utterance is relevant to its assertoric content, That is, what needs to
be shown is that (metaphysical) necessity and contingency are properties of the assertoric
content of an utterance. For it is only then that we can use Leibniz's Law to conclude that a
difference in modal status entails a difference in assertoric content. But Kripke's argument
assumes, rather than argues, for this thesis.
None of this would be news to Kripke, Kripke himself does not take his ordinary language
argument as decisive, but rather relegates it to the status of "indirect evidence", 35 The only
reason I have dwelt upon it is because it seems to be the only argument advanced by Kripke
which, if true, would demonstrate the truth of CA, and hence RT. Another consideration raised
by Kripke which could be marshalled in support of RT is, in his words, "that we have a direct
intuition of the rigidity of names, exhibited in our understanding of the truth-conditions of
34Kripke's original argument proceeds by considering propositional anaphora, signaled by
the use of "that". However, "that", if anything, is even looser than "what is said". Consider, for
instance, the naturalness of such locutions as "That's news to me"
35"...[V]arious secondary phenomena, about 'what we would say', such as the ones I
mention in the monograph and others, give indirect evidence of rigidity", Naming and
Necessity, p, 23.
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particular sentences"." It would be difficult to account for this intuition, unless we suppose
that the rigidity of a term affects what we understand (i.e. the assertoric content),
Kripke's appeal to intuition here raises difficult questions about the role of intuition in
philosophical theorizing. There is no question that certain kinds of intuitions are crucial in
philosophy. Examples of these include a speaker's intuitions about different possible
interpretations of a given sentence, or, in the case of Ethics, clear intuitions about the rightness
of a given act. However, Kripke's intuition is not an instance of either of these kinds.
The notion of truth-condition is one which itself requires a philosophical explication. Thus,
the thesis ihat rigidity is relevant for individuating the truth-conditions of unmodalized
sentences is a philosophical thesis, Now, a philosophical thesis can be justified by appealing to
"lower-level" intuitions which the philosophical thesis helps explain, For instance, a
philosophical thesis about content gains support if it accounts for "lower-level" intuitions of
the form: an utterance u of a sentence S says something different from an utterance u' of a
sentence S'.37 But Kripke's intuition is not a "lower-level" intuition. Rather, it is a "direct"
intuition about the truth of a substantive philosophical claim,
Some might maintain that this fact automatically shows the illegitimacy of Kripke's appeal
to intuition. 38 However, I think it is incorrect to discount the intuition on these grounds alone.
The correct response is rather to grant that there is some intuition which underlies Kripke's
remarks, but to deny that it has the consequences which Kripke believes it to have. What
36Naming and Necessity, p. 14. This consideration is advanced more in support of claims
other than CA and RT.
"Of course, these lower-level intuitions are, as I have been emphasizing throughout,
nonetheless quite defeasible.
38See, for instance, Michael Dummett, The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981)], pp. 579 ff., which are part of the appendix on
Kripke,
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should be granted to Kripke is that a grasp of rigidity is required for some (perhaps quite
important) uses of proper names. But if one wishes to use the intuition in support of CT, then
one must provide an argument to the effect that the relevant use is the use of proper names in
the speech-act of assertion.
One such argument might come from a consideration of the notion of a truth-condition.
For surely, it might be argued, the notion of truth-condition is a modal notion. However it is
explicated, it should fall out that knowing the truth-condition of a sentence implies knowing in
what possible circumstances the sentence is true, Since the sentences;
(15) Aristotle was fond of dogs
(16) The last great philosopher of antiquity was fond of dogs
differ in truth-value in some metaphysically accessible world, then surely their truth-conditions
are different.
The problem with this argument is that it presupposes that the notion of possibility which
underlies our talk of truth-conditions is metaphysical possibility. But metaphysical possibility
is only one of a plethora of different notions of possibility, This variety is clearly reflected in
ordinary uses of modal terms, Indeed, if Angelika Kratzer is correct, which of these notions is
expressed by an utterance of a modal term is hopelessly context-dependent, 39 Given these
diverse senses, what argument exists for the thesis that it is metaphysical modality which
grounds our talk of truth-conditions?
The question becomes even more pressing, given that (15) and (16) would have the same
truth-conditions on a number of different senses of possibility. For instance, if it is common
knowledge that Aristotle is the last great philosopher of antiquity, then (15) and (16) will have
39See her "What 'Must' and 'Can' Must and Can Mean" Linguistics and Philosophy I
(1977), pp. 337-355.
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the same truth-conditions, if we construe the possibility in question as epistemic, More
plausibly, however, the possibility in question is neither epistemic nor metaphysical possibility.
Our assertions are made with a background of shared presuppositions, the most central of
which are presuppositions about the meanings of our words. If the meaning of an expression is
characterized as a set of core beliefs about the semantic properties of the expression, then
perhaps the only possible circumstances relevant for determining the truth-conditions of the
utterance are those in which these beliefs are true. On this conception of truth-condition, it is
not possibility which allows us to individuate the content of terms, but rather content which
allows us to say which possibilities are relevant.
I do not mean to imply that some version of the truth-condition argument can not be
defended. However, simply stating that the notion of possibility in question is metaphysical
does not constitute such a defense, What a friend of this argument must establish is that
circumstances which are metaphysically possible, but not possible in any other sense, are
involved in the individuation of the content of assertions.40 However, I am skeptical of the
success of such an argument for the following reasons,
First of all, there is a well-supported notion of truth-condition according to which not
every metaphysically possible circumstance is relevant for individuating assertoric content.
Consider again the relation between "The F" and "The actual F". As we saw in Section I,
utterances of simple instances of the schema, rThe F is G0 and (The actual F is G0 seem to
have the same assertoric content,41 Why do we seem to have the intuition that utterances of
4 0If one takes assertoric content to be characterizable by sets of possible worlds, then one
must, of course, also establish that any possible circumstance involved in individuating the
content of an assertion is also a metaphysically possible circumstance.
41A similar point holds for temporal rigidity, and the relation between the Noun Phrases,
"the current President" and "the President", Consider:
(a) In the year 2001, the President will be Colin Powell,
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such sentences say the same thing, despite the fact that they typically differ in truth-value in
some metaphysically accessible world? One explanation is that the link between modality and
truth-conditions only implies that sameness of truth-conditions entails that in whatever possible
situation in which the words have the meaning they actually do, whenever one of these is
uttered truly, the other could have been uttered truly instead. That is, if two utterances u and u'
have the same assertoric content, then in any possible circumstance in which u is uttered, u'
could have been uttered, without a change in truth-value.
Notice that "any possible circumstance" cannot be construed as any metaphysically
possible circumstance. For there are metaphysically possible circumstances in which the
meanings of the words differ. If this is indeed the constraint which modal notions place on
sameness of truth-conditions, then only those possibilities are relevant in which the words have
the meaning they actually do,42
The second difficulty facing the defender of the truth-condition argument is that, even if
the correct explication of truth-condition is not that just suggested, it is still difficult to see
why every metaphysical possibility should be relevant for individuating assertoric content,
When (15) is uttered (in a non-modal context), why should every esoteric metaphysical
possibility be relevant in accounting for successful communication between competent
speakers? If understanding an utterance of (15) requires being able to distinguish between
(b) In the year 2001, the current President will be Colin Powell.
Though "the current President" and "the president" have the same content (here, considering
temporally simple sentences), (a) clearly says something different from (b).
42Places in which it is argued that this is the correct modal constraint on truth-conditions
include Dummett's appendix on Kripke in The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy (see esp.
p. 565), Evans's "Reference and Contingency" (see esp. p. 207), and, most explicitly, Martin
Davies and Lloyd Humberstone, "Two Notions of Necessity", Philosophical Studies 38 (1980),
pp. 1-30 (see esp. pp. 16-17),
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possibilities, then surely only those possibilities that are "open" in some epistemic sense, are
relevant.
That the argument from truth-conditions is often appealed to in support of CT is a touch
ironic. For a central moral of Kripke's work is that many philosophical arguments, such as that
for the contingency of identity, fail because they equivocate between different senses of the
term "possible". Stemming, as it does, from pre-Kripkean times, it is difficult to avoid the
suspicion that the alleged relation between the content of an assertion and metaphysical
possibility is supported by precisely the type of equivocation between senses of possibility
which Kripke warned us to avoid, 43
As we have seen, the ultimate motivation for RT is the idea that a necessary condition for
two utterances to have the same assertoric content, or truth-conditions, is that they have the
same truth-value when evaluated with respect to every metaphysically possible world. This is a
significant, non-obvious thesis about the identity-conditions of assertoric contents, It thus
requires either some independent justification, or the production of a philosophically
interesting notion of content according to which it is obvious, It remains to be seen whether
either of these tasks can be accomplished,
Before we conclude, I would like to make one positive, albeit quite tentative, suggestion
concerning the proper place of the distinction between rigid and non-rigid expressions. If, as I
have suggested, modal properties do not hold of the contents of assertions, from what do the
43Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (New York: Routledge, 1988) is
generally thought to contain the first formulation of the truth-condition argument. Yet it is
obvious from 4.464 of the Tractatus (p. 99) that Wittgenstein fails to distinguish between
epistemic and metaphysical necessity. Camnap, the other famous pre-Kripkean proponent of the
truth-condition argument, of course completely rejects an independent category of metaphysical
necessity,
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modal properties of an utterance arise? Necessity and contingency are not merely properties
which hold fundamentally of utterances, Rather, they stem from some non-syntactic source.
I believe it fruitful to locate semantic differences between expressions which do not always
affect the content of assertions in the use of those expressions in other speech acts. In
accordance with this, my suggestion is that the modal semantic value of an expression arises,
not from its use in assertions, but rather fundamentally from its use in the speech act of
counterfactual supposition. Our assertions are made with a background of shared
presuppositions, some of which serve to fix the references of our expressions. A central
purpose of supposition is to suppress these often quite fundamental presuppositions, and to
imagine what the world would be like if they were false, Rigidity allows us to speak of the
denotations of our expressions in counterfactual situations in which our shared assumptions do
not hold, But this does not show that rigidity affects the content of ordinary assertions, where
competent speakers may always employ these presuppositions,
Conclusion
Our discussion has left several questions open. Most markedly, we have not attempted a
positive account of the relation between the intuitive notion of assertoric content and semantic
value. The relation between these notions raises several issues, For instance, "The President is
the president" and "The actual President is the president" have the same assertoric content, but
the assertoric content of the two sentences that result from embedding them respectively under
"It is (metaphysically) possible that" do not. Yet to say that two sentences can share the same
assertoric content, but contribute different things to the assertoric content of sentences
containing them, is simply to deny that there is a function which maps the assertoric content of
the parts onto the assertoric content of the whole, Thus, the intuitive notion of assertoric
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content is not compositional. Attempts to represent the assertoric content of an utterance as a
semantic value, which I believe to be a central motivation behind Stalnaker's paper,
"Assertion", are open to the kind of critique discussed in Section II, precisely because it seems
that compositionality is a principle governing semantic values tout court, Whether we should
follow Dummett in denying that the intuitive notion of assertoric content is to be directly
accounted for by a compositional semantic theory, or follow Stalnaker in altering semantic
theory to allow for a more direct expression of this notion, is unclear.44
It is sometimes maintained that, from a certain non-epistemological perspective, the
differences between utterances of the sentences "Hesperus is Phosphorus", and "Hesperus is
Hesperus" are unimportant. 45 What I have been emphasizing in this paper is that from a
perspective motivated by the attempt to give an account of assertoric content which has some
relation to use, the differences between rigid and non-rigid terms are unimportant. Since there
is no convincing argument to the contrary, I must conclude that the idea that rigidity provides
44On pp. 20-21 of Naming and Necessity, Kripke gives voice to a similar pessimism about
representing the objects of belief as semantic values as Dummett does about so representing
the objects of assertion:
My view that the English sentence 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' could sometimes be used to
raise an empirical issue while 'Hesperus is Hesperus' could not shows that I do not treat
the sentences as completely interchangeable. Further, it indicates that the mode of fixing
the reference is relevant to our epistemic attitude toward the sentences expressed. How this
relates to the question what 'propositions' are expressed by these sentences, whether these
'propositions' are objects of knowledge and belief, and in general, how to treat names in
epistemic contexts, are vexing questions, I have no 'official doctrine' concerning them, and
in fact I am unsure that the apparatus of 'propositions' does not break down in this area.
45In particular, by advocates of "Russellian Singular propositions". I do not mean to
endorse this position here.
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some deep insight into the content of an expression remains an unsupported dogma of the
philosophy of language.46
46j am especially indebted to Richard Cartwright, Richard Heck, and Robert Stalnaker,
Without their input, the paper simply could not have been written, Kathrin Koslicki, Sanford
Shieh, and Timothy Williamson also merit special thanks. In addition, I have benefitted from
discussions with George Boolos, Noam Chomsky, Lenny Clapp, Michael Glanzberg, Joe Lau,
Peter Ludlow, and Daniel Stoljar,
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